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Southeast Asia Report

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AUSTRALIA

OPPOSITION TO WHITE SOUTH AFRICAN MIGRANTS REPORTED

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 8 Jun 86 p 3

[Article by Nic Van Oudtshoorn]

[Text] Opposition to the growing flood of white South African migrants is building up in Australia.

The influential SYDNEY MORNING HERALD devoted almost a full page to the subject this week, calling the South African migrants "the new boat people--they're here a week and they buy a boat".

The article points out that Australian immigration regulations preclude the overwhelming majority of non-white South Africans.

It warns that well-to-do white South African migrants are forming "little Johannesburgs" in some of the country's richest and most influential suburbs.

The article examines their opulent lifestyles after arriving in Australia, and gives prominence to the warnings of Karel Solomons, a coloured computer operator, who migrated to Australia after being detained without charge in solitary confinement in 1978.

"They are coming to Australia in such large numbers, and with such financial resources, that it's certain they will become very prominent people, even to the extent of influencing government policy," he warned.

Crucial

"They (the whites) are coming today because they can sense the inevitability of racial equality in South Africa -- and can't accept that.

"They are the sort of people who refuse to work with black people, to have them as neighbours, to have their children going to school with them ...

"It's crucial that Australia sets up some sort of special immigration committee to screen these people. South Africa is a unique country and needs unique measures. We must prevent these racists getting into the country."

Letters to the editors of leading Australian newspapers have also shown a growing fear among Australians that admitting too many white South Africans could cause problems for Australia, particularly in racial areas.

In the first two months of this year alone, 691 South Africans (almost all white) emigrated to Australia.

Inquiries at the Australian Embassy in Pretoria from people interested in emigrating to Australia rose by 650 percent last year, while entry visas increased from 1 737 to 3 607.

There is now a seven-month waiting-list before prospective migrants who meet Australia's stringent requirements can even get an embassy interview.

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4200/1152

AGREEMENT SIGNED FOR HO CHI MINH CITY FACTORY AID

Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 28 Apr 86 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Agreement Signed for Ho Chi Minh City Aid in Industry, Handicrafts and Forestry"]

[Text] On the evening of 25 April 1986 at the Muang Lao Hotel in Vientiane, the Vientiane Municipality Industry, Handicrafts and Forestry Section signed a cooperative agreement in industry, handicrafts and forestry with the Ho Chi Minh City Industry, Handicrafts and Forestry Section. Mr Phimpha Thepkhamheuang, chief of the Vientiane Industry, Handicrafts and Forestry Section, and Mr Huynh Ngoc An, chief of the Ho Chi Minh City Industry, Handicrafts and Forestry Section signed the agreement in front of Mr Sithon Sibounheuang, a permanent member of the Vientiane Administration Committee, vice chairman of the Vientiane Municipality Administration Committee and also the chief of the Economic and Cultural Cooperation Commission, and Mr Bounthot, deputy chief of the Vientiane Administration Office, and other cadres concerned from Laos and Vietnam.

The agreement states that both sides agree unanimously to improve existing factories with the aid of the Ho Chi Minh City Industry, Handicrafts and Forestry Section, such as factories for plastics, toothpaste, tires, confectionaries and others in 1986 to expand the special fraternal relations between Vientiane and Ho Chi Minh City, which have been helping each other continuously.

The same evening the Industry, Handicrafts and Forestry Section organized a dinner for the delegations. It was held in a very warm and intimate atmosphere.

12587/9738
CSO: 4206/104

CAPITAL STATE TRADE SECTOR, RELATIONS WITH PRIVATE SECTOR, SRV

Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 28 Mar 86 pp 2, 4

[Article: "Views on the Trade Sector Presented to the First Congress of the Municipal Party Committee of Vientiane"]

[Excerpt] In the past 10 years the trade sector of Vientiane City has progressed and made improvements in many areas, and as a result it has gradually gained a firm position on the distribution front line in the fierce, complex struggle between the collective, state-owned sector and the non-socialist sector.

In the 10 years after Liberation trade is considered to have been the harness chain pulling production and improving society's standard of living. There is more motivation in building state and cooperative trade than in the past so that the trade sector is more vigorous and has increased in quantity and improved in quality; this sector has transformed capitalist private trade and brought it into concert with the policies of the state. During the initial part of this period the trade sector of Vientiane City proceeded according to the policy memtioned and had a plan of operations for each year; they were able to achieve the plans steadily in the first 5 years (from 1976 to 1980). This was the period of the beginning of socialist trade and the transformation of private trade. The role of the trade sector in the initial period was simply to distribute aid from other countries and goods from the central authority; it was not ready for the role of buying and selling or of administering an import-export trade monopoly. The trade network had not expanded. There were stores only in towns. The restaurants were generally privately owned. Generally speaking, in this initial period private business had a strong position in imports and exports and in distribution. During the second period, from 1981 to 1985, the trade network was improved and expanded in the following areas: state stores, purchase-sales cooperative, tailor shops, and restaurants. In addition private trade was transformed and utilized according to the policies of the party. There were requisition purchases of agricultural goods, especially food from farmers. Forest products and a number of strategic goods were exported.

From 1983 to 1984 the trade sector of Vientiane City proceeded according to Resolution 34 of the political bureau of the party Central Committee

concerning the improvement of Vientiane under the close leadership of the party Central Committee as well as the party committee of Vientiane City; it struggled to surmount various difficulties, achieved success, and found a new way to expand in the immediate future and in the long term.

There are six companies involved in the expansion of the city's trade network. Of these, two handle imports and exports. There is a total of 1,444 cadres in trade. There are 65 state stores, stores serving state workers, tailor shops, restaurants, hotels, and tourist centers. There are two stores selling goods for foreign currency and one tailor shop for international clothes. There are 154 people's cooperative exchanges; these are generally located in the 3 outer districts. The state stores and cooperative exchanges perform the function of buying and selling by signing contracts to buy from and sell to the farmers and producers.

In the past year the trade sector of Vientiane City has struggled to achieve the planned goal. In 1984 the income from sales reached almost 700 million kip. Of this 137 million kip went to fulfill budget obligations. In 1985 sales reached 3.2 billion kip, and 569 million kip were used for budget obligations. The state trade sector was able to turn over its inventory 15 times per year. Partnership trading companies were able to turn over their inventories 27 times in 7 months.

In foreign trade, from the beginning of 1984 to the present the trade sector of Vientiane City has been able to establish trade relations with the capital, Hanoi, and Ho Chi Minh City in three categories: buying and selling, bartering, and trade cooperation. The trade sectors of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City allowed the trade sector of Vientiane City credit for goods for 2 years. Hanoi sent goods valued at more than $173,000 to the trade sector of Vientiane City. The trade sector of Vientiane City sent goods valued at more than $230,000 to Hanoi. Ho Chi Minh City sent more than $562,000 worth of goods to Vientiane City, and Vientiane City sent more than $426,000 worth of goods to Ho Chi Minh City. In addition there was cooperation between Vientiane City and Ho Chi Minh City in exploiting and processing timber for export; they have so far exploited 5,300 cubic meters of timber and are continuing this business.

The lesson which governs cooperation in trade as well as in other areas with Vietnam, is beneficial for both sides, and is in agreement with the policies and plans of our party is that lesson which has changed our direction toward the east and the socialist countries. In addition we have trade relations with some capitalist countries only in order to meet our need for some kinds of, raw materials, machinery, and consumer goods.

With regard to transforming and utilizing private trade, the trade sector of Vientiane City has monopolized the import-export trade completely and abolished licensed trade over the border by individual capitalists. It has organized joint companies between the state and individuals to run the import-export businesses. It set up 71 share-holder stores with individuals; the prices at these stores were set by the state. It also

went into partnership with six factories making consumer items for the internal market: a toilet soap factory, a cigarette paper factory, a toothpaste factory, an insulated plastic bag factory, a candle factory, and a paint factory. In addition to stores there were also a number of production bases: there were four rice mills that are able to mill 65 tons per day, two animal-processing units, and a trade school. These production bases have been resolutely advancing and are very efficient. They have an operational basis and are governed by principles that are responsive to a socialist economy and commerce, and their income must equal expenditures and profits. This ensures the three benefits of production and provides a good budget for enterprises and individuals.

The requisition purchases of goods from farmers and production within Vientiane City amounted to 528 million kip in 1984. Requisition purchases in 1985 amounted to more than 1,7 billion kip. The requisition purchase of rice in 1984 totaled more than 13,000 tons and in 1985 totaled 17,000 tons. In the past 2 years Vientiane City has been self-sufficient in rice for consumption and has been able to fulfill its obligation to the central authority to a certain extent.

The trade sector of Vientiane City turned to grassroots organizations to improve and build cooperative exchanges, and it signed purchase obligations with the farmers and producers so that agricultural goods, forest products, and handicrafts would be handled primarily by state trade.

In 1984-85 the trade sector built trade relations with other provinces within the country so that now there are purchase and barter relations with almost every province based on the principles of responsiveness to the economy and mutual advantage.

Together with these successes, the trade sector of Vientiane City had some weak points and shortcomings:

The building up and improvement of the rank and file of the trade cadres are not complete; their numbers, quality, and specialties do not meet the requirements of their duties in the trade sector at the present time.

With regard to building and expanding the trade network, for example, of the cooperative exchanges, stores, and restaurants are just numbers; the quality is low and goods and services are not good. They are not operated correctly according to the new system and socialist trade.

The signing of two-way contracts with farmers and producers is not proceeding well. The state trade sector is still not making requisition purchases of all the agricultural products and forest products under its control, including food.

The state trade sector still does not control the market places; for example, the control of goods, prices, foreign exchange, and gold or valuable substances in the market places is still chaotic. Prices are not steady and normal, and this has an effect on production and the lifing standard of the cadres and workers.

The improvement and expansion of the trade network must aim at expanding the obligation both to buy and sell by signing contracts with producers and increasing the turnover of inventory. The state trade sector must make progress and handle 95 percent of all goods in its control, especially food and forest products.

The transformation and control of private trade must proceed in order to help the entire economy, which must expand and serve society. Partnership trade and production partnerships between the state and individuals must be expanded and private funds must be used for exports. Private trade must be controlled and kept within the established order so that it uses suitable methods.

Cooperation in trade should be expanded with Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and the capitals of socialist countries to create a firm base for our trade and to engage in trade with a number of capitalist countries which is in our interest.

We should strive to achieve the export goal of the plan for 1986, which amounts to 4 billion kip. And from now until 1990 we should strive to expand this 12.5 percent each year. It is important for trade that we put the goods produced in the country in a strong position in order to meet domestic demand and the demand for exports. Vientiane City has been able to create the conditions to do this, especially with regard to agricultural products, forest products, handicrafts, etc.

8149/9190
CSO: 4206/100

NOUHAK ORDER ON RICE SALES SEEKS COMPETITION WITH PRIVATE SECTOR

Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 28 Apr 86 p 2

[Article: "Additional Council of Ministers Order Governing 1986 Rice, Forest Goods Purchases"]

[Text] To the ministers, state chairman and chairmen of the Vientiane Province and Vientiane Municipality Administrations.

A. Present condition of rice, coffee bean and forest goods purchases.

On 18 December 1985, the Council of Ministers issued Order 37/LPRP, concerning rice, coffee bean and forest goods purchases. To the present, all central and local trade sections have been following this order fairly well.

Many local trading sections have been implementing the barter rates between industrial goods and agricultural goods that the Council of Ministers outlined in correspondence with actual local situations, and many have been implementing the reform economic system.

Buying goods with cash has protected the interests of farmers and the state; consequently, the order has been well supported by farmers.

Working units and local units have been responding to the needs of the local people, such as for galvanized sheets, nails, sarongs and others. Cash flow has been getting better and more timely; subsequently, the volumes of rice bartered and bought have been fairly high in many provinces. Some provinces have started to implement trade reform for only 2 months, but they have been able to barter for higher volumes of rice than in all of 1985.

Purchases of coffee beans in Champassak and Saravane Provinces have been higher over the same period in 1985.

Nevertheless, trade reform in certain areas has been experiencing some problems:

In purchasing rice, coffee beans and forest goods we need to set up more cooperative trade sections and sales and purchases contracts must be signed by both sides, the state and the families of producers. In reality, we have been able to implement these new ways for trading very little. In some provinces, we have been able to buy more rice than elsewhere, so that setting up cooperative trade sections and using contracts have been overlooked.

Implementing the barter rates between industrial and agricultural goods and forestry goods seems to be out of balance in a number of provinces. Industrial goods seem to have better prices than agricultural and forest goods.

Established barter rates appear to have been inflexible. For example: a province has raised the price for one galvanized sheet to 45 kgs of rice, one sarong to 62 kgs of rice paddy, one bunch of cotton to 19 kgs of rice paddy. The same rates have applied throughout the province and prices have been set without taking into account production conditions. Each area has differences; for example, some roads for transportation in each area are distant, some are near, some difficult, some convenient. Exchange rates have not depended on the current prices in a particular area or period. The interests of farmers have not been protected. Therefore, many farmers have not been enthusiastic to barter rice with the state, regardless of whether harvests have been more or less than those last year.

Some provinces, such as Khammouane and Luang Prabang Provinces, have set their barter rates too high without taking into account current market prices. Consequently, a lot of goods have been stuck in warehouses at the same time as private merchants have been pouring goods into the market.

Estimating capital, deducting trade fees, sharing revenues and expenses for the various business units and meeting budgetary obligations to the state have not been clear, uniform and appropriate. Revenues for the state have lessened. Various sections in charge of inspecting various business units have experienced many difficulties due to the lack of definite and uniform exchange rate regulations.

Party and administration committees in some provinces have not paid attention to guiding purchases of rice, coffee beans and forest goods at correct prices.

B. To guarantee more success in purchasing rice, coffee beans, yarn and forest goods than previously, the Council of Ministers has advised regarding these issues:

1. Continue to concentrate forces of cadres, goods and money in buying rice, coffee beans, yearn and various forest goods and coordinating the expansion of cooperative trade with both parties signing contracts, between farmers and cooperatives, handicrafts workers and state employees who have family businesses.

Both parties must negotiate and agree before signing contracts in order to avoid exploitation by either party concerning the type, quality, price and place of delivery of merchandise.

A contract must have four copies so that the parties signing it can keep one copy, one copy goes to the town administration committee and one to the bank providing the loan. In a case where there is a complaint by one of the parties to the contract and there is still no economic appeal organization, the complaint must be sent directly to the district administration concerned to solve the problem.

2. It is stipulated that barter rates or prices or cash payments for goods must be based on realistic and actual prices in each local market and for each season. We must avoid stipulating inflexible barter rates or prices and cash purchases that do not take into account actual production situations, transportation routes, and needs in each locale. For example, each province must apply the barter rates for exchanges of industrial goods and forestry goods or stipulate the cash purchase prices and how to protect the interests of producers and of the state. Stipulated barter rates or prices or cash payments must be approved by both sides.

In reality, stipulated barter rates for goods might be 5 percent lower than the barter rate in the private sector. For example, a private merchant might barter 1 kg of glutamate sodium for 100 kg of rice, but the state might barter for 95 kg of rice in order to encourage farmers to sell rice to the state. The state's offering price might be the same as the private sector's or 5 percent lower.

That is all we have to do to encourage farmers to more and more sell their crops and their forest goods to the state; this is also the way to eliminate competition from the private sector.

3. If a producer needs several tools or consumer goods or cash for production, we might advance him goods and give him loans, which he would pay back with his crops.

Goods exchanged by barter or cash must be equivalent in price. For example, one bicycle could be bartered for 1,100 kg of rice from a farmer, meaning if a farmer has 1,100 kilograms of rice, he can buy a bicycle.

We are doing this to protect the interests of sellers and the state; there are no loopholes for opportunists.

All purchasing organizations are guaranteed a return on their investments and reasonable trade fees so that they can cover all reasonable expenses for purchasing and bartering and make definite profits so that the businesses will continuously grow.

Capital and fees are fixed for each amount of purchased products. Therefore, purchasing organizations make more revenues and profits if they trade and exchange larger volumes, not according to the prices they trade at, in order to avoid price increases.

These are the obligations to the state budget in the purchasing task:

In purchasing goods, the organizations directly involved have an obligation to the state budget for the volume of goods bought less the capital and trade fees. Suppose the central government's Export-Import Company invests 10,000 m of khaki clothes to barter with a provincial trading company for 775 kgs of cardamum, and another district trading company is also involved in this trade.

From the 775 kgs, the following deductions must be made: 359 kgs for capital, 17.8 kgs for the Export-Import Company's trade fees, and 12.6 kgs for the district trading company's trade fees. This means that the total expenses for investment and trade fees is 409.2 kgs. Therefore, the obligation to the state budget in this exchange is approximately equal to the 775 kgs of unhusked cardamum, minus 409.2 kgs, or 365.8 kgs.

Budgetary obligations must be divided among state budgets at different levels in accordance with the regulations governing budget allocations that the Council of Ministers has laid down.

C. Concerning Management

After the order is issued, all ministers and chairmen of state committees and of provincial and municipal administration committees must disseminate it urgently and implement it strictly.

A research team of state and Office of the Council of Ministers officials has the duties of advising and assisting all local working units in closely following this order, and also of following up and closely inspecting units to promote the implementation of this order.

Vientiane, 7 March 1986
Signed in the name of the chairman of the Council of Ministers

Signed and sealed by the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers,
Nouhak Phounsavath

12587/9738
CSO: 4206/104

VIENTIANE DISTRICT LPRP CHIEF ON ORGANIZATION, SECURITY PROBLEMS

Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 1 Apr 86 pp 2, 4

[Article: "Views of Comrade Bounloet, Party Secretary of Natsaifong District, Presented to the First Congress of the Municipal Party Committee of Vientiane"]

[Excerpt] Hatsaifong District is a district affiliated with Vientiane City. It is situated next to the Mekong River along the Lao-Thai border. It is more than 70 km long and is next to Nong Khai Province. There are 56,660 people and 71 villages in the district. One of the villages is on an island in the Mekong. It is called Ban Donsangkhi Village. It is a strategic point for defending the border.

In the past 10 years Hatsaifong District has changed; it has a movement and many new factors which have created a firm base of support. This is remarkable and makes us proud.

For example, with regard to defending the nation and the peace, even though there is the border on the Mekong River next to Thailand for more than 70 km and there are two border-crossing points which face the tricks and sabotage of the enemy all the time, nevertheless, because of the spirit of the party's policy for defending the nation and the peace for all people, peace and safety are assured and all is secure. Strengthening our forces constantly both in quantity and in quality has shown results as follows: 91 of the enemy have been killed, 160 have been captured, 52 have surrendered, and 64 weapons have been captured.

The farmers have been mobilized to join in cooperative socialist production. There are now 52 agricultural cooperatives with 1,861 families; this equals 28 percent of the farm families. We have organized 747 labor exchange teams. In the area of distribution, 3 district stores, 58 cooperative exchanges, and 1 credit cooperative have been set up.

As concerns the creation of a dictatorship of the proletariat in our district, the district was a white area before Liberation, and it can be said that there was no support in the past. After Liberation there were only 15 party members, who were organized in 1 party unit. But by firmly abiding by the leadership role of the party, the administration of the

state, and the mastery of the people, we were able to bolster the party's cadres and membership both in quantity and in quality. Now we have 86 party members. On 13 June 1985 the district held the historic first congress of the district party organization and elected a 17-member party administrative committee for the district. There were 18 party units and of these, 10 were in the countryside. These party units conducted their own congress. At the same time that the party was being built, cadres were being trained.

We paid close attention to the mass organizations; the Lao People's Revolutionary Youth Union had 1,098 members, the women's confederation had 3,077 members, and the trade unions had 482 members.

Even though Hatsaifong District achieved this success, change, and growth, nevertheless when compared with the needs of the party and the revolution in this new era, there are still many unsolved problems such as the following:

The policies of the party are still not well understood or put into practice in every area as would be appropriate for the situation in order to expand the capabilities of the district. The mobilization and collective mastery of the people are still not widespread or resolute. Organizing at the grassroots level is not coordinated. The party organization has lessons and standard procedures, but the administrative units at each level from the district to the village still do not show the responsibility and determination to lead the people in doing their duty to look after their localities and steadily build up their district.

8149/9190
CSO: 4206/100

BRIEFS

SRV EXPERTS DEPART AFTER 4-MONTH TOUR--On the evening of 26 April at the Vientiane Administration office, Mr Sithone Sibounheuang, a permanent committee member of the Vientiane Administration and chief of the Economic and Cultural Commission of Vientiane, hosted a farewell party for the experts of the Hanoi Ceramic Tile Plant. This expert team was led by Mrs Tran Thi Kim Dung, a ceramic tile factory expert, to tour Vientiane for more than 4 months. In his farewell speech, Mr Sithon Sibounheuang expressed his admiration and his deepest appreciation to Mrs Tran Thi Kim Dung and the team for succeeding proudly in their work. He stated that this contributed to reform and development and the expansion of socialism in Vientiane, and also tightened the friendly, fraternal and special solidarity between Laos and Vietnam, between Vientiane and Hanoi. At the end, he expressed his best wishes to this expert team to return to their country safely. [Text] [Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 30 Apr 86 pp 1, 4] 12587/9738

DISTRICT LPRP STRENGTH, COMBAT--In 1975, there were 70 party members, of which 10 comrades were members of the Indochinese Communist Party. The older generation of members has built a good foundation from their beautiful heritage with the Indochinese Communist Party and their fellow Vietnamese. Between 1976 and 1985 we grew to 238 members in 32 party units. We concentrated on improving and expanding mass organizations to expand our membership and in the qualifications of their members. The LPRYU was not formed then, but it is now growing, with a membership of 855. The district has a special situation, with a 50 km bordering Thailand. The enemy constantly agitates and attacks the new regime daily. We are therefore expanding our security network in rural areas. We are building up and promoting the people in security activities throughout the entire district. The security system now has improved many times compared to when the country was newly liberated. The guerrilla militia and the local district military in combination with municipal forces and central government forces have been able to maintain peace over 10 years 1,120 times, killed 352 enemies, and seized 88 weapons. So in summary, we have been able to basically secure our land and maintain the peace in our basic production areas as well as maintain our culture and our communities. [Excerpt] [Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 14 Apr 86 pp 2, 4] 12587/9738

LUANG PRABANG BANK DEPOSITS--Savings accounts and the savings lottery are presently very popular in Luang Prabang Province. Since the beginning of the year, cadres, workers, military, police and the general public in Luang Prabang have put up to 1 million kip in their savings accounts and bought savings lottery tickets at their provincial State Bank branches. Savings deposits have been 257,000 kip. [Excerpt] [Vientiane KHAOSAN PATHET LAO in Lao 28 Apr 86 p A4] 12587/9738

SRV-AIDED ROAD CONSTRUCTION--Sekong Province is located 700 km south of the capital. Sekong Province is going to restore Route 16 in the beginning of April with the aid of its twin province, Quang Nam Danang of the SRV. This third class road runs through mountainous areas; an 8 m wide and 50 km long stretch runs from Sekong town hall (Ban Tha Pheuay Mai) to Tha Teng, connecting Saravane Province to Champassak Province. The road will be completely paved in 1990. This aid implements the agreement and the economic cooperation treaty that the two provinces, Sekong and Quang Nam Danang, signed in 1985. [Text] [Vientiane KHAOSAN PATHET LAO in Lao 3 Apr 86 p A4] 12587/9738

XIENG KHOUANG TRADE CO-OPS, NATIONAL TOTALS--Xieng Khouang Province is currently concentrating on setting up and tremendously expanding cooperative stores. To date, there is a total of 20 cooperative stores, double that since 1984. In 1985, in addition to growth in volume, each cooperative store also concentrated on buying and bartering with the people around the province. Trade amounted to 100 million kip, which is 66.45 percent more than planned. With the expansion of cooperative trade around the country during the past 10 years, we have been able to establish 900 coop stores and 1990 we expect to have 2,500 cooperative stores around the country. [Text] [Vientiane KHAOSAN PATHET LAO in Lao 29 Apr 86 p A7] 12587/9738

ELECTRIC WIRE, BATTERY PLANT PRODUCTION--In the first quarter of 1986, the cadres and workers of the plastic bag and electric wire plant under the Ministry of Industry and Forestry worked hard on their plan. They performed more than projected in many areas, with net revenues of 22,798,900 kip. In this first quarter, they produced 50 tons of plastic bags, water pipes, straws, palm rope and rubber sheets, which is 10.3 percent more than the amount in the first quarter plan; this production represents 27 percent more than that in the annual plan. The plant also produced 95,600 m of different size electric wires, which represents 15.60 percent more than in the quarterly plan and 28.8 percent more than in the annual plan. Presently, the plant is speeding up production to raise quality and volume controls in order to score achievements to commemorate the upcoming 100th international proletariat anniversary on 1 May. [Text] [Vientiane KHAOSAN PATHET LAO in Lao 25 Apr 86 p A5] 12587/9738

CSO: 4206/104

COTABATO EDITOR CRITICIZES IMF ADVICE

Cotabato City THE MINDANAO CROSS in English 10 May 86 p 4

["Comments on News by Patricio P. Diaz, Editor--"IMF: Saviour or Executioner?"]

[Text]

International Monetary Fund has advised the Aquino government to raise the taxes on petroleum products. This would increase our revenue and consequently reduce our projected budget deficit.

Good advice. If balancing the budget is the only facet of the economy. But, no. In fact, IMF knows that the many measures of the deposed Marcos government to balance the budget on the advice of IMF had caused economic misery among the people. Prices ran away!

Initial responses from the cabinet and the media showed the unacceptability of the IMF recommendation. That will trigger new price increases at a time when prices are either stabilizing or going down gradually. At our local supermarket, prices of agricultural products are observed to be going down.

However, the IMF advice has some invisible strings attached. Will refusing to heed the advice not jeopardize the country's negotiation for more loans from the IMF and the international banks? The Marcos regime had to toe the IMF line to avail of loans.

Ironically, the IMF gives out loans and economic advice so the client country will improve its economy and eventually pay off its debts. Our country has $26. + billions to pay the IMF and foreign banks. Yet, when the advice would work against the good of the people, the IMF becomes irrelevant to the ultimate end of the loans it has facilitated.

The increase of taxes on petroleum products will make the life of the people harder. It will torpedo the Aquino program to reduce prices as the answer to the economic need to raise income. Higher taxes on petroleum products will certainly chain-react adversely against employment and industry.

If the country can use its export revenues to expand local industries and foreign markets, perhaps we can generate more revenues to eventually pay off our foreign loans. But how to do this when more than $2-billion of our export revenues (equivalent to more than 50 per cent of our 1986 budget) could just pay for the interest on our more than $26-billion foreign debts?

In fact, if IMF really wants to help the Philippines recover, it must allow the new Aquino government a reasonable period to use its export revenues productively while facilitating more loans necessary to perk up the economy to a boom.

Save heavily indebted countries, not kill them with stringent conditions and coercive recommendations. President Allan Garcia of Peru would use only 10 per cent of his country's export revenues to service its foreign loans. Can President Aquino and her cabinet do this?

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COTABATO EDITORIAL HITS FAILURE OF RECONCILIATION

Cotabato City THE MINDANAO CROSS in English 24 May 86 p 4

[Editorial: "Good Faith Still Lacking"]

[Text] National recovery – political, economic, moral -- is *the* key to our survival as a people and nation from the ruins of the 20-year Marcos regime. That is topmost in the agenda of the Aquino administration.

To achieve this, President Corazon C. Aquino proclaimed a policy of national reconciliation in many of her public statements; she appealed repeatedly to all sectors for cooperation. Toward this end, the government is being reorganized and available resources are being mobilized. This quest for national recovery has the pledge of support from many foreign governments.

Today, 88 days after the assumption of Corazon C. Aquino as president, the course of national recovery still appears uncertain. There has been progress to sustain hope but not substantial enough to dispel apprehensions.

Why?

National reconciliation has been more in words than in deeds. Anyone in government service identified with the Marcos regime is subject to replacement. Even career officials and employees have lost the guarantee of tenure under the civil service system.

Any business firm suspected of having the Marcos connection is subject to sequestration. Ill-gotten wealth must be restored to its legitimate original source; but in the process, the government defeats its policy of reconciliation and projects the image of vindictiveness.

These gave the so-called Marcos loyalists the excuse to harden their stand against the Aquino government telling the world: "Look, we want to cooperate, to help, but we were humiliated and harrassed." The nation is divided.

What's the consequence?

President Aquino's repeated appeals to all sectors for cooperation towards national reconciliation and recovery has appeared hollow. Labor and capital are still in uneasy peace. Many taxpayers are still reluctant to pay their taxes. Investment has not come.

The Communist Party of the Philippines and their many fronts have seized this division to sow intrigue between President Aquino and the military and within the military establishment. Their initial response to President Aquino's call for a ceasefire and negotiation was stepped up armed operations.

While the failure of the Aquino government to present a comprehensive economic program is the reason for the delay in assistance from foreign governments and banks, the present political division and instability in the country must have stopped foreign private investments from coming. Even local investors are very cautious.

As it approaches its first 100 days, the Aquino government must assess its objectives, successes and failures. And it must see how much

good faith is there behind the good intentions.

Without the commensurate good faith, national reconciliation is not possible. Without national reconciliation – in the real sense and scope of *reconciliation* – national recovery will be difficult to attain. Lacking in good faith to generate good faith all is in danger to be lost.

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NEW MINDANAO GROUP BATS FOR 'UNITY OF FILIPINO PEOPLE'

Cotabato City THE MINDANAO CROSS in English 24 May 86 pp 1, 12

[Text]

A new group, calling itself Mindanao Independence Movement for a Free and United Philippines, has come out with a manifesto opposing all forms of government that will tend to undermine the freedom and unity of the Filipino people under one flag and one central government.

In a related development, interviews conducted by **The Mindanao Cross** in Sultan Kudarat province further revealed a common non-Muslim stand against the Tripoli Agreement as it is

CRISIS

This new group envisions the Filipino race as having been sustained by "centuries of struggle for freedom, justice, truth and democracy." In the February revolution, it said, the Filipino passed a "moment of crisis and liberation."

But, the new group said, the Filipino is being threatened by the "secessionists, federalists, opportunists, . . and agitators" who would implant foreign ideology and sow the seeds of disunity.

FAILURE

The movements to establish the autonomies in the South and in Cordillera and the Federal Republic of Mindanao "are destructive to the integrity and honor of the Republic of the Philippines."

Pointing to the autonomous governments of Region IX and XII, the new group said the experiment was a failure because the 70 per cent Christian population had been discriminated against.

The Tripoli Agreement, the group said, "is null and void because the people affected were never consulted. . . ."

NEW GROUP . . .

RECOMMENDATIONS

The new group suggested to President Aquino "to nip in the bud such movements" and to "take alternative remedial measures" and establish a "strong central government supported by strong autonomous provincial, municipal and baranggay governments."

The new group urged the government to "respond to the threat of rebellion and sedition" and respond also "to the complaints of neglect, injustice, violation of human rights and other legitimate grievances of the people."

CAMPAIGN

A group in Sultan Kudarat is trying to get the whole province of Sultan Kudarat involved in the discussion of the Tripoli Agreement. Literature on the accord is being spread to supplement discussions in the radio.

A group interviewed said that if there is any agreement, the people must be involved. Areas and sectors must be represented. As the Tripoli Agreement was signed without consulting the people, it is not binding to them.

It is a common belief that the Christians are not endangering the culture and religion of the Muslims. And they object to any suggestion that they have grabbed Muslim lands.

Whatever lands the Christians own today were either bought from the Muslims or acquired directly from the government.

Many there, old leaders, young leaders, or students do not see the necessity of the autonomy. The Muslims and the Christians, they said, are already living in harmony.

The preservation of the Muslim culture, they said, depends on the Muslims themselves. They have the freedom. Apparently, young educated Muslims also want modernity to change some of their cultural traits.

They expressed the apprehension that the real motive behind the autonomy move is for the Muslims to regain political supremacy, for the minority to rule the majority. The autonomy, some believe, is one step to secession or independence.

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PHILIPPINES

CHURCH PASTORAL LETTER URGES PARTICIPTION IN CON-COM

Cotabato City THE MINDANAO CROSS in English 17 May 86 pp 1, 11

[Text] Editor's Note:

Following is the joint Pastoral Exhortation of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines to be read to all Masses in Catholic Churches throughout the Philippines tomorrow.

"Unless the Lord build the house, they labor in vain who build it." (PS. 127:1)

Beloved People of God:

Today our nation stands before a difficult path of transition.

If the Chosen People of old, after their liberation from Egypt, had still long ways and long years to go in their journey to the Promised Land, it would not be farfetched to say that our people may be destined to pass through tortuous paths in our search for national reconciliation and unity, relative peace and prosperity.

One great forward step in this path is the coming formulation of a Constitution for our country that will express our noblest ideals and embody the basic laws that will allow our people the opportunities for their pursuit of happiness in an atmosphere of freedom, justice, and equality.

During these days, the selection of the men and women who will write that Constitution is going on. Let us accept as an unchangeable decision — hopefully for the better — the manner of their selection through a Committee. For all the objections against this, it is also a good method, with precedents in our country (in 1898) and in others (as in West Germany right after the II World War). On the other hand, our experience with an elected body which wrote the 1973 Constitution was not altogether a happy one.

If we, the people at large, will not have a hand in the final selection of the writers of our Basic Law, let us, nevertheless, by all means, be involved in its formulation. While the Constitutional Commission is in the process of writing the Law, let us keep track of their work through the media, let us feed the Commission with our ideas and opinions individually and through organs like the nationwide "Consultation" sponsored by the Bishops-Businessmen's Conference in collaboration with other groups.

Above all, let us continually pray for the success of the Commission's work. The Lord heard our prayers with our Blessed Mother and granted the fulfillment of our libertarian aspirations in the surprisingly brief and successful events last February. Surely He will be ready to hear our prayers again that our lawmakers may be enlightened to make our journey to our goal of a unified and reconciled nation less lengthy and less difficult.

We are appending to this letter a prayer for the success of the Constitutional Commission's work. We ask you to pray this prayer individually and in groups.

In particular, we set the first and second day of June as days of special prayer. On the first will be a whole day exposition of the Blessed Sacrament; on the second, all Masses throughout the land will be a supplication to the Holy Spirit for His light and strength. Monday, June 2, will be also a day of nationwide voluntary fasting, penance, and sacrifice.

God will help us if we pray and work. No one in his wildest scenarios foresaw the conclusion of events of the past three months. It was God's script. With continuous prayers and participation nationwide, we can be sure the writers of our Fun-

damental Law under God will work for the true good of our country and with their unselfish efforts lead us to our desired goals.

In closing, we invoke upon you all the blessings of Jesus and Mary His Mother and ours.

Given on this 18th day of May, Feast of Pentecost, in the year of Our Lord 1986.

For the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines:

(Sgd) † RICARDO
CARDINAL VIDAL
President

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The South Cotabato model, if proven successful, can become an argument to modify the Church-State relation in terms of *cooperation* instead of *separation*. Cooperation of Church and State (and the Government) arises from the fact that the Church and the State exist for the same people.

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PAPER LAUDS COTABATO CHURCH-GOVERNMENT COOPERATION

Cotabato City THE MINDANAO CROSS in English 17 May 86 p 4

[Editorial: "Church-Government Cooperation"]

[Text] South Cotabato is making a "first". OIC-Gov. Ismael D. Sueno has involved the Catholic Church in the development and reconciliation programs of the province and the Church has accepted the invitation with its active participation.

The Sueno provincial administration has organized the Multi-Agency Reconciliation and Development Task Force (MARDTAF) to solve both economic and peace and order problems. The Church is represented in the top body of the task force by Bishop Dimualdo Gutierrez of the Diocese of Marbel.

In the provincial administration's reconciliation program, the Church's role is to make contacts with the rebel groups to ask them what they would like the government to do for them and what they would like to do for the government. Reconciliation is basic in the over-all development of the province.

In the agricultural development of the province, the Church's role is to help, through its Social Action Center, infuse into technology and financing moral and attitudinal values. The Church's social action workers will conduct seminars at the expense of the provincial government.

How successful the Church-Government cooperation in South Cotabato will be is too early to assess. But it provides a starting point for reflection. In the past 20 years, the Catholic Church in the Philippines had been virtually considered by the Marcos regime as a de-stabilizing agent against the government – even to the extent of accusing it as an ally of the Communists. Programs of the Church running parallel to the socio-economic programs of the government for the rural people had been labeled as communist fronts.

But with the February 7 snap presidential election and 78-hour February (22-25) revolution, the Catholic Church has proven that, while She is against a corrupt and an oppressive regime, She is not against the State. She will cooperate with the State and the Government for the good of the people.

The South Cotabato model may as well be considered seriously by the other provinces especially Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao. The Catholic Church in these provinces will certainly appreciate an invitation to cooperate in the government programs for development and reconciliation.

In the case of Maguindanao, Muslim religious leaders should be asked also to cooperate. Together with Christianity, Islam must be a potent element in infusing moral and attitudinal values among both the Christians and the Muslims.

Where possible, the other Christian religious groups should also be involved.

MAGUINDANAO OIC SETS PRIORITIES ON ROADS, TRADE ZONE

Cotabato City THE MINDANAO CROSS in English 24 May 86 pp 1, 12

[Text]

The establishment of a trade zone in Maguindanao and the construction of more roads are the top priorities in the development program of OIC-Gov. Zacaria A. Candao for Maguindanao.

While, as OIC-Chairman of the Lupon Tagapagpaganap ng Pook 12, he identified peace and order as having the top priority in the region, the trade zone is also for the region and interlocks with peace and order program.

As of Wednesday this week, Candao could not yet give details about the trade zone. He said his staff is still drawing the mechanics.

PEACE, ORDER

Evidently, Candao, by his concept of peace and order in the region, does not mean the return of the MNLF to the folds of the law as did the previous administration. He means

TRADE ZONE, . . .

reconciliation of the rebels with the masses and the government according to the Tripoli Agreement.

"The old administration could have established rapport with the masses and the fighters," he said. He regretted that the "people are not aware of the important issues."

He welcomed the present discussions in the press and radio of the autonomy under the Tripoli Agreement by both the Christians and Muslim elements.

INFRASTRUCTURE

In Maguindanao, Candao sees the need of more baranggay and farm-to-market roads and irrigation systems. He said that there's a lot more to be done in both categories of infrastructure.

In the region, Candao deplored the loss of more than P10-million in ghost projects in 1984 and 1985. He said he will ask the Kuwait government to re-program part of its $10.8-million fund for the Oroquieta-Misamis road for the construction of the Marawi-Cotabato City road.

The region, Candao said, needs more roads, bridges, fish landings, wharves.

FINANCES

Both the region and Maguindanao are experiencing financial difficulties, Candao said. The regional government has inherited a total of P3.6 million in debts. It needs P900,000 to pay the back salaries of casuals.

After Cotabato Light and Power Co. cut the LTP power connections including the courts, LTP paid P50,000 and arranged for the payment of P254,000 more.

In Maguindanao, the provincial government has enough funds for operations but none for development. Tax collection is very poor, he said. (See: related story, page 1, column 3.)

CHANGES

No retrenchment was mentioned in the Maguindanao provincial government. However, in the LTP, the casuals and other employees were retrenched.

Among the 18 mayors in Maguindanao, only three have been replaced by OIC's. More will be replaced, Candao said, although he said that there will be a few incumbents who will be retained.

Some members of the Batasang Pampook and of LTP will be replaced eventually, Candao said.—ppd.

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SULTAN KUDARAT OIC CITES NEED FOR ROADS

Cotabato City THE MINDANAO CROSS in English 24 May 86 pp 1, 12

[Text] ISULAN, S. Kudarat – All-weather roads are what Sultan Kudarat province needs for its rural development program through agriculture, this was stated by OIC-Gov. Perfecto Bautista last Monday.

Those who may have seen Sultan Kudarat's prosperous farms and barrios from the national highway to General Santos City may not believe this statement. But a look at the relief map of Sultan Kudarat would show more than two-thirds of the province is without all-weather road.

This portion is the fertile upland valleys and plains between the coast and the mountain seen from the highway. The coastal towns are isolated from the capital town, reaching it through the rugged logging road or the sea via Cotabato City.

PROTEST

Bautista protested vehemently the unfairness and injustice in the allocation of road funds by the Ministry of Public Works and Highways, pointing to an item in the May 18 issue of the Manila Bulletin as an example.

In that issue was a report that there is an P18.05-million appropriation for 15 infrastructure projects in the autonomous region of Central Mindanao. These are all for roads and bridges.

Of the P18.05-million, Lanao del Sur has a share of P9.5-million and Sultan Kudarat has P400,000. Maguindanao, P4.6-million and Cotabato, P3.55 million.

Comparing the taxes being paid to the government, Bautista said, where is the fairness and the justice.

With more all-weather roads to connect the barrios and the markets, to link the coast and the capital town, Sultan Kudarat will be more progressive to raise more revenues for the government.

ECONOMIC PROGRAM

Bautista said that the integrated agricultural program of the previous administration under Gov. Aurelio Freires is good. He said his administration is adopting it adding some priorities of his own.

What the people need, he said, are irrigation, technology, loans for inputs, and market. He is trying to involve the different ministries to provide these for the people to generate economic development.

Besides roads, the people needs electrification. He is negotiating with the Sultan Kudarat Electric Cooperative on how to extend the electric lines to the coastal towns using the cheaper National Power Corporation energy.

Peace and order is good, Bautista said. With the exception of some disorders in the boundary areas with Maguindanao (MNLF) and South Cotabato (NPA), Sultan Kudarat is peaceful.

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TWO COMMANDERS, FOLLOWERS BOLT NPA OVER 'SEVERE' POLICIES

Cotabato City THE MINDANAO CROSS in English 24 May 86 pp 2, 11

[Text] Severe and punitive policies initiated by the top hierarchy of the Communist Party of the Philippines–New People's Army caused the splitting up of the ranks encouraging some to embrace the law in recognition of the reconciliation stance of the Aquino Government.

Two NPA commanders together with their thirty-two followers whose areas of operation covered Davao del Sur and Kidapawan, Cotabato surrendered lately to the Cotabato Provincial Command in President Roxas "as we are disgruntled with these severe and violent policies advanced by the CPP–NPA hierarchy."

These commanders were only identified as "Bitoy" and "Dodoy" who signified their intention to "start a new life" under the new government spelling out their three general demands: protection, livelihood opportunities, and appointment of their qualified followers to the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.

When interviewed by the Notre Dame Broadcasting Corporation recently, the surrenderees complained that the CPP–NPA hierarchy had shifted to undemocratic and oppressive policies to the prejudice of the members.

The surrenderee-commanders said that top brass leaders have become dictatorial and bias in their judgment as they resorted to severe punishment of members for mere doubts of shifting loyalties or suspected of being government secret agents.

They deplored the "killings of our members without justifiable grounds and due trial". They said a number of their followers have been tortured but "we have managed to escape from this ordeal".

They hinted that the hierarchy is undergoing reorganization among the ranks but "the system has become undemocratic and suppressive" as a number of them were salvaged.

In his visit last week to Cotabato City, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile said the oppressive, dictatorial, and suppressive tendencies of the CPP–NPA hierarchy forced rebel-priest Fr. Conrado Balweg to his own group and proposed to the government the autonomy of the Cordillera.

Enrile said the ministry is studying the possibility of granting autonomy on areas where it is necessary similar to the Southern Philippines based on the Tripoli Agreement.

Asked why they turned to the hills, Commanders Bitoy and Dodoy said they were disenchanted with the Marcos administration as many government officials had become unconcerned with the suffering of the people. – rmt

SWEDISH KNOW-HOW, EQUIPMENT FOR IMPROVEMFNT IN CIVIL DEFENSE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 29 May 86 Sect III p2

[Article by Sune Olofson: "Singapore Buying Swedish Civil Defense Proficiency"; first paragraph is SVENSKA DAGBLADET introduction]

[Text] A state delegation from Singapore is in Sweden in order to purchase Swedish know-how in civil defense. Sweden and Switzerland are considered the best in the world in civil defense proficiency.

This will be the first time that Sweden has sold civil defense.

The Civil Defense Administration is the selling authority. Following a Riksdag decision last year the Civil Defense Administration, in cooperation with the Export Council, is now also considered a service export authority.

The Export Council will act as the contact with the firm which sells the material.

"We are selling system solutions for how to build a modern civil defense," said Bjorn Engstrom of the Civil Defense Administration.

Singapore has large shortages in its civil defense, and will now expand it in accordance with the Swedish model. The delegation is now travelling around Sweden and looking at the wartime civil defense command posts, among other things.

Singapore has already signed the order. What is now happening is a first orientation and information about how civil defense is organized.

"We are informing them, among other things, about communications equipment and how information for the population should be readied during the preparedness phase," said Bjorn Engstrom.

Visit School

The delegation from Singapore is going to visit the Civil Defense Rescue School in Revinge in Skane, where instruction is given in firefighting, how to

search for survivors among wreckage, and other things.

The Civil Defense Administration will also tell them how to transform the subway tunnels into shelters.

When the delegation has received basic training it is the intention that the Export Council will seek to get orders for the Swedish companies which sell civil defense equipment.

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COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

VONADK INTERVIEWS FORMER DK ENVOY TO PRC

Views Battlefield Situation

BK160640 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 15 Jun 86

["First Part" of 8 June interview with former Democratic Kampuchean Ambassador to the PRC Pich Cheang to VONADK representative--recorded]

[Text] I am very happy, comrade representative of the national army radio, that you have come here today to interview me personally I would like to inform you about the situation of our Cambodian people's struggle against the Vietnamese aggressors in our region inside Cambodia. First of all, I would like to inform you that after fulfilling my mission as Democratic Kampuchean ambassador to the PRC in 1984, I returned to our country. During the past more than 2 years, I have joined with our comrades-in-arms in the fight against the Vietnamese enemies inside the country -- that is, in the first group of battlefields on the southern part of the Tonle Sap region.

The situation of the Vietnamese enemies on the battlefields where I and the national army have been conducting our activities is as follows:

During this 8th dry season, the Vietnamese enemies have sent a number of their troops to resist us and defend Pursat town, Route 5 from Pursat to Krakor, and the railroads from Pursat to Kamreng and from Pursat down the river bank to Reang Til and Tonle Sap Lake. In this area, the Vietnamese enemies have stationed a division of their forces, that is the 388th Division to be responsible for the Defense of Route 56 leading from Pursat to Leach. This division has actively defended this strategic route. Besides this, the Vietnamese enemies have pulled their free regiments from other battlefields to be stationed in various areas below Route 5 from Neakta Thvea and the nearby jungle to the banks of Tonle Sap Lake. This does not include the many other battalions of Cambodian soldiers. Compared with last dry season, in this dry season the Vietnamese enemies have sent more troops to this region. The Vietnamese enemies have concentrated on reinforcing their troops on this battlefield because:

1. This battlefield is of strategic significance to the Vietnamese enemies militarily, economically, and in terms of communications and transportation.

If passage on the railroads and Route 5, which stretch through this region, is blocked, the Vietnamese enemies' military activities in the western border region will be seriously affected. Moreover, this region abounds with fresh water fish because it is a big fishing region in our country.

2. During this 8th dry season, our national army has launched more active and effective activities in accordance with our new five attack tactics than in the previous dry seasons.

3. The Vietnamese enemies have repeatedly said that they must pay attention to strengthening their forces in this region in order to block our transport units from moving to areas northwest of Phnom Penh, Kompong Chhnang, and Kompong Speu.

4. Concerning the Moung-Pursat battlefield, the area where I launch my activities, and other battlefields inside the country, the Vietnamese enemies have claimed that they had already cut almost all of our transport routes from the border region to regions inside the country. They said that during 1985-86 they would launch an offensive to sweep all of our national army combatants from the Moung-Pursat area. The Vietnamese enemies have taken many steps militarily, economically, and in terms of psychological warfare in order to carry out this goal.

I would like to mention only some of the significant activities the Vietnamese enemies have carried out in an attempt to resist us and sweep away our national army. Simultaneously with the military offensive, the Vietnamese enemies have actively tried to prevent our national army from reaching the food supply sources. This is why immediately after the rainy season arrived simultaneously with the harvest of the early rice, the Vietnamese enemies stationed their forces around the harvest areas in an attempt to cut our national army's food supply and divide our national army from the people. However, the Vietnamese enemies have completely failed in this attempt. The Vietnamese enemies could not disconnect our national army from the people. Nor could they cut out our food supply sources. They could block one area, but many others are left open. Having failed to block us, the Vietnamese enemies have turned to measure the rice granary in each family of our people. Any family that dares to keep a larger quantity of paddy than the limit they set would be accused of being the agent of the national army and all the paddy would be confiscated. They order the people in some communes to store their rice in Moung District seat and allowed them to bring back this rice for consumption only in an amount enough for a few days when needed. As for salt, they allow each family to buy only 2 to 3 cans a month. However, this Vietnamese plan has also failed.

Having grasped the Vietnamese enemies' situation and their weak points in all aspects, we have established procedures for combat against the Vietnamese enemies. We launched military combined with political activities against the Vietnamese enemies. We attacked their weak points and launched operations to disperse the cruel administrations of the Vietnamese enemies and to liberate and disperse the Cambodian soldiers and commune and village

militiamen and guerrillas. We did this repeatedly. From last December to the third month of this year, our national army gained quite a significant degree of control over the communes and villages aroung Moung District and Svay Don Kev township and a number of communes along both sides of Route 5 near Pursat town. The Vietnamese enemies could not counter us. Facing this situation, the Vietnamese enemies have become very panicky. They then prepared a large-scale offensive to resist us by withdrawing their forces from (? a district), from Thnal Bot, from the 388th Division, from Svay Don Kev, and from various other areas and sent them to Pursat in order to boost the morale of these soldiers, which is very low.

Taking advantage of the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops from Svay Don Kev township and Moung District seat, we urgently attacked and destroyed Svay Don Kev township and then Moung District seat successively, with splendid results. From the end of March to the end of April, the Vietnamese enemies mobilized their forces from the 388th Division in Pursat Province and from Samlot and South Sisophon battlefields -- totalling almost (? 3) divisions, escorted by 18 tanks and 6 aircraft -- to launch an operation against us from the Svay Don Kev River banks on Route 5 and the upper part of Moung River bank to Koas Krala. But the Vietnamese enemies failed to harm our forces. All they found was empty land. This is because whenever the Vietnamese enemies send a large batch of toops to attach us, we divide our forces into small guerrilla groups to launch guerrilla activities in accordance with the specific conditions in each area by launching guerrilla attacks, and planting mines to trap the Vietnamese forces.

We have thus decimated the enemy forces and engaged quite a number of them in this area. While being engaged in the upper region, the Vietnamese enemies have left a space in the communes and villages along Route 5, along the railroads, and the areas below Route 5. We sent a number of our combined forces to sweep up and disperse the Vietnamese enemies' commune and village administrations along Route 5 and along the Moung River, such as Prey Toch, Kakaoh, Chrey, Ta Loas, and some other communes in the lower part of Pursat Province. The Vietnamese enemies were afraid that we would attack various important strategic areas along Route 5. They were then compelled to withdraw a part of their troops to defend this area, and they mobilized their forces from various areas on this battlefield to launch an operation against us in the jungle area -- that is, the Tonle Sap region in Pursat Province -- in mid June. But they again failed to find our combatants. We used our small groups of forces to attack the Vietnamese troops, causing successive losses to them. Meanwhile, we could defend our forces to the maximum. At the same time, we could regularly attack and destroy the Vietnamese administrations in various communes and villages throughout the province. The Vietnamese enemies were desperate and lost the initiative. All they could do was pursue us.

In the current 8th dry season, we, the national army, on this battlefield have made significant contributions to [words indistinct] the Vietnamese enemies together with our forces on all battlefields throughout the country. On our battlefield, the Vietnamese enemies have suffered from

conflicting ideas on concentrating or dividing forces to cope with us. They do not know what to do, since mobilizing forces from communes, villages, and the countryside to defend the areas around towns and populated areas will leave a void in the countryside, and sending forces to protect the countryside will leave a vacuum in the interior, affecting the railroads, national highways, and towns. The present situation of the Vietnamese enemies in this region can be compared with a rotten cloth which is torn after being mended.

Moreover, in the current 8th dry season, the Vietnamese enemies have tried to drive our forces out of the southern part of the Tonle Sap region by launching several operations usccessively, but to no avail. We still stand firmly in this area and have counterattacked the Vietnamese enemies, inflicting successive defeats on them. (?This year), we have not launched attacks against any important strategic places in Pursat town, but we have repeatedly attacked and dispersed the Vietnamese commune and village administrations and liberated our fraternal Cambodian soldiers in various areas. We cut railroad tracks, destroyed bridges, and attacked various populated areas more successfully than in previous years.
We could also defeat a large-scale offensive by the Vietnamese enemies. During the past few years, they have not carried out such large-scale offensives.

Discusses 'Fraternal Cambodian Soldiers'

BK170254 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 16 Jun 86

["Second Part" of 8 June interview with former Democratic Kampuchean Ambassador to the PRC Pich Cheang by VONADK representative -- recorded]

[Text] Now I would like to inform you about the situation of the fraternal Cambodian soldiers. In the current 8th dry season, the situation of the fraternal Cambodian soldiers on the Moung-Pursat battlefield has changed and developed markedly as on all other battlefields throughout the country. The most outstanding event was the mutiny against the Vietnamese enemies staged by the fraternal Cambodian soldiers of the 1st and 2d regiments of the 2d Division posted in western Leach and Pursat sectors. This mutiny lasted for several days and many Vietnamese enemies were killed or wounded. Other fraternal Cambodian soldiers on the Moung-Pursat battlefield and our people in this province were alarmed when they heard about this mutiny, but they warmly welcomed it. The Vietnamese enemies tried hard to conceal the news, but how could they cover up such big news? This event greatly encouraged the people and fraternal Cambodian soldiers on this battlefield.

Later, there was another mutiny against the Vietnamese enemies staged by the fraternal Cambodian soldiers at the drawing school near Pursat town. This was followed by another mutiny against the Vietnamese enemies by the fraternal Cambodian soldiers in the 69th and 71st company units in Moung District. They opposed the Vietnamese plan to send them to fight

and die on the western border battlefield. There have been many cases of mutiny by the Cambodian soldiers in various areas, and many have refused to follow the Vietnamese enemies' combat orders and fled back home. This has happened almost everywhere, such as the areas around Moung District, at Svay Don Kev, and the southern and eastern parts of Pursat Province.

After we publicized these events among the fraternal Cambodian soldiers and after our forces repeatedly attacked the Vietnamese commune and village administration and liberated many fraternal Cambodian soldiers, the Vietnamese enemies lost their trust in the fraternal Cambodian soldiers. They withdraw the Cambodian soldiers posted in various important strategic places in outlying villages and communes, sent them to the interior, and replaced them with Vietnamese soldiers. Morally speaking, the fraternal Cambodian soldiers have become bored with the Vietnamese enemies. The Vietnamese enemies must think hard about the settlement of their conflicts with the fraternal Cambodian soldiers. These conflicts have become more serious and complicated. We know that the Vietnamese enemies will never be able to befriend with the Cambodian soldiers. They can hardly use the fraternal Cambodian soldiers now.

Relations between the fraternal Cambodian soldiers and the DK National Army combatants have developed favorably. As I have mentioned, there are many important reasons for the Cambodian soldiers to mutiny against the Vietnamese enemies. For example:

1. Because the Vietnamese enemies bully, look down on, kick, and even kill the fraternal Cambodian soldiers as they do to animals;

2. Because we have become more confident in the strength of our national army which has vigorously intensified its offensive against the Vietnamese aggressors;

3. Because they have come to realize that the national army is very patriotic, really fights for the defense of our Cambodian nation and race, and strictly implements the clemency policy towards the Khmers as our slogan says: The Khmers do not fight their fellow Khmers; the Khmers must jointly fight against the Vietnamese aggressors. This slogan has become a practical deed on the battlefield. The fraternal Cambodian soldiers have become well aware of this matter.

In the developments in this dry season, we can see that the fraternal Cambodian soldiers have now become a coordinated force, joining with our national army in the fight against the Vietnamese enemies. For example, on the Svay Don Kev battlefield, the fraternal Cambodian soldiers gave us information about the Vietnamese movement, led our forces to attack the Vietnamese enemies, and even joined in the combat. On the Moung-Pursat battlefield, the situation is even more favorable to us. The only problem is to organize and arrange how to use this force more effectively and appropriately.

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VOK DOUBTS SRV CAN CONTROL CAMBODIA POLITICALLY

BK160804 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0500 GMT 16 Jun 86

[Political commentary: "Will Vietnam Be Able To Control Cambodia Politically"]

[Text] Observers in the west and other parts of the world believe that Vietnam is planning to control Cambodia politically even after the total withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia. Thus, what Vietnam needs to do in Cambodia now is to strengthen the Heng Samrin regime -- its puppet -- and strive to weaken the CGDK forces by giving political training to the Heng Samrin soldiers and administrators so as to make them trust only the Vietnamese and to fight against the CGDK forces before Vietnam can withdraw all its troops from Cambodia.

Let us take a look at events in Cambodia to see how far this Vietnamese attempt has gone and whether the Heng Samrin regime's current situation is secure enough for Vietnam to withdraw all its troops from Cambodia. After its invasion of Cambodia in 1979, Vietnam forced the Heng Samrin regime and Heng Samrin army. Over the past several years, while launching operations in an attempt to wipe out the anti-Vietnam CGDK forces, the Vietnamese have tried everything to strengthen and promote the political affairs among the Heng Samrin administrators and soldiers.

Vietnam has truly expended much effort in the political field. After its occupation of Cambodia, Vietnam immediately appointed Vietnamese officials, both military and civilian, to supervise the Cambodians. The Vietnamese ordered the Cambodians to open political schools and forced them to attend political courses that teach about the long-standing friendship and solidarity between Cambodia and Vietnam. The Cambodians are ordered to chant various political slogans about Cambodian-Vietnamese friendship and solidarity, such as: May the Cambodian-Vietnamese solidarity last for tens of thousands of years.

Within the ranks of the puppet regime, the Vietnamese have tried to teach the Cambodian administrators to respect the Vietnamese, regard the Vietnamese as their teachers, and follow Vietnamese orders. The Vietnamese have tried to strengthen the Heng Samrin army and give political training to its members in order to make them trust and follow Vietnamese orders, thus fulfilling this stage of their plan to turn the

Heng Samrin regime into a popular regime among the Cambodian people and enable the Heng Samrin army to become a strong one that has a Vietnamese-style political concept and that listens only to Vietnamese orders. By then, the Vietnamese might be able to gain full control of the political affairs in Cambodia.

But does the current situation in Cambodia accord with this Vietnamese plan? We see that the current situation in Cambodia is totally contrary to Vietnam's wish. The situation in Cambodia greatly disappoints the Vietnamese. As of now, the Heng Samrin regime is still very isolated and does not enjoy the people's support, and the Heng Samrin army remains a weak army. Worse still, many Heng Samrin soldiers fled to join the CGDK forces, which are launching actions against the Vietnamese aggressor troops. Some other Heng Samrin soldiers killed many Vietnamese soldiers and even joined hands with the CGDK forces in launching counterattacks against the Vietnamese. By now, the Vietnamese have admitted that not only have they failed to control political affairs in Cambodia, but their forces have also been unable to withstand the increasingly vigorous attacks by CGDK forces with the full support of the Cambodian people.

In sum, we see that the Vietnamese are now using full force in controlling and occupying Cambodia. No matter how hard or how many years the Vietnamese try to implant their political ideas among the Cambodians, we think the Cambodians will never listen to this Vietnamese political fabrication. If the Cambodians have listened to the Vietnamese political policy, the Vietnamese would by now have realized their goal of controlling Cambodia politically. On the contrary, the Cambodians know very well that the real intention of the Vietnamese in coming to Cambodia is to plunder Cambodia's land and bully the Cambodian race. Realizing this, all Cambodians from whichever political faction have adhered to our only path -- that is, to do anything possible to drive the Vietnamese out of our country so that our Cambodian nation can survive.

We think this Vietnamese strategy has already failed. Therefore, the Vietnamese have no other choice but to keep their troops in Cambodia. Otherwise, they will have to resort to another strategy: placing Cambodian-speaking Vietnamese soldiers within the ranks of the Heng Samrin army after the withdrawal. However, the Cambodians will strive to eliminate any Vietnamese schemes for the survival and independence of the Cambodian nation.

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COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

VODK DISCUSSES STRATEGY IN FIGHTING AGAINST SRV FORCES

BK050500 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 4 Jun 86

[Station Commentary: "The Vietnamese Enemy Aggressors Are Losing Initiatives and are Following our National Army and Guerrillas"]

[Text] Since the total defeat of their blitzkrieg strategy in 1979, the Vietnamese have considered the border areas as their key battlefield to determine the outcome of the war. They have massed their forces along the border in an attempt to wipe out our forces and seal off our supply lines from the border to zones inside Cambodia. As for us, we consider the area around the Tonle Sap Lake as the first battlefield to determine the outcome of the war because this area is economically-rich and is used by the network of transport lines, both on land and along waterways, from Phnom Penh to western Cambodia as well as to the Cambodia-Thai border area.

If we transform this area into a battlefield, then the Vietnamese will not be able to use it as an economic base to feed their agressor troops in Cambodia, particularly those posted along the border. Every transport line from Phnom Penh to western Cambodia would also be blocked. If we achieve this goal, Vietnamese forces along the border would be starved to death.

The Vietnamese have tried to launch successive attacks against us in the border areas. In the 8th dry season, they tried to launch large-scale offensives to achieve their aims of sealing off the border and then smashing our resistance forces. However, they have failed. As for us, we have made efforts to carry out activities in accordance with our plans. We have reinforced our regular troops to carry out activities in the areas around the Tonle Sap Lake since 1982. We have transformed the area around the Tonle sap into an increasingly hotter battlefield. Provincial and district seats and various townships in the five provinces around the Tonle Sap have been successively and repeatedly attacked by our forces each season. Along the Tonle Sap River and Route 5 between Phnom Penh and Battambang and along the Phnom Penh-Kompong Thom-Siem Reap Route 6, we have carried out successive attacks. Important bridges have been destroyed, and we have also repeatedly cut the railroad track. Administrative networks in communes and villages in the five provinces have also been repeatedly attacked and

and dismantled by our forces. Along with this, we have expanded the battlefield to Phnom Penh's suburbs and constantly attacked the Vietnamese in areas around Phnom Penh. Since the beginning of the 7th dry season, our activities have increased. This has greatly worried the Hanoi Vietnamese because their neck is being increasingly strangled from year to year. The Vietnamese clearly realize that our national army's attacks have not only destroyed all kinds of materiel and fighting force but also greatly changed their political and military geography.

In fact, the Cambodian people, Cambodian soldiers, and various administrative staff, forced to serve the Vietnamese, have in greater numbers provided support and assistance and cooperated with the Democratic Kampuchean National Army in fighting against the Vietnamese enemy aggressors. If this situation persists, the Hanoi Vietnamese war of aggression in Cambodia will be finished. This is why at the end of this dry season, the Vietnamese were forced to withdraw a major part of their forces from the border to resist us in zones inside Cambodia, particularly in the area around the Tonle Sap Lake and around Phnom Penh.

Therefore, on the battlefield, the Vietnamese are at a loss and can no longer depend on their strategy. They have been forced to follow and go after our Democratic Kampuchean National Army. Before, they concentrated their forces along the border and now they are forced to withdraw these forces and deploy them inside Cambodia to resist our national army. Can the Vietnamese resist and dislodge our national army from the area around the Tonle Sap Lake and from zones inside Cambodia? No. The zone inside Cambodia is larger than the one along the border. If the Vietnamese cannot attack us along the border, they would have even less chance of deploying their forces to resist us, it would be even easier for our national army and guerrillas to smash them. If they concentrate their forces, more gaps would appear thus facilitating our national army in its activities. This is the conflicting situation which is dragging the Vietnamese enemy down every day.

The situation on the battlefield is favorable to our national army and guerrillas. In this situation, our national army and guerrillas throughout the country will further intensify their attacks against the Vietnamese to force them to lose all initiatives until they agree to hold talks to resolve the Cambodian issue politically as suggested in the tripartite CGDK's 8-point proposal.

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COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

VOK RAPS SRV REASONING FOR OCCUPATION

BK120820 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0500 GMT 12 Jun 86

[Political commentary: "Who Will Be in Power in Cambodia After Vietnam's Withdrawal?"]

[Text] While world opinion is strongly denouncing Vietnam for occupying Cambodia and demanding that Vietnam withdraw from Cambodia to let Cambodian people decide their destiny themselves, Vietnam has declared that it will not pull out of Cambodia because it is afraid that Pol Pot would return to power. Vietnam says this because it wants to show that it does not want to stay in Cambodia, that it does not want to annex Cambodian territory, and that it does not want to control Cambodia; Vietnam stays in Cambodia because it has pity on the Cambodian people and is afraid that Pol Pot would return to massacre them. In this feature, we will examine and see whether Vietnam's fear is justified and discuss who would be in power in Cambodia after Vietnam's withdrawal.

To answer this question, we should try to see how Vietnam would withdraw from Cambodia. Vietnam has two possibilities for withdrawing its forces. Vietnam either withdraws from Cambodia voluntarily without any agreement or does so after some sort of agreement.

Concerning the first possibility, according to which Vietnam would withdraw without any agreement, we shall discuss who would be able to hold power in Cambodia. We can almost guarantee that this would never happen unless Vietnam mistakenly thinks that the Heng Samrin regime -- which is its puppet -- is capable enough to lay the role of Vietnamese puppet forever without the presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. If Vietnam could withdraw based on this line of thinking in mind, then Heng Samrin would not be able to survive and would last for probably no more than a week. Then, even after the eventual collapse of the Heng Sarmin regime, Pol Pot would not be able to return to power as Vietnam pretends to fear because the other two groups of the CGDK -- the FUNCINPEC [National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia] led by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and the KPNLF [Khmer People's National Liberation Front] led by His Exellency Son Sann -- would certainly not surrender their weapons to the communist party's organization like in 1975.

Concerning the second possibility, according to which Vietnam would withdraw with an agreement, we would like to ask through which way Pol Pot could return to power, because if Vietnam withdrew this way, there will certainly be free elections under international supervision. Pol Pot and his group could return to power only if they could somehow show that people think they are necessary to the Cambodian nation. Only then would the Cambodian people vote for them. On the contrary, if Pol Pot cannot convince the Cambodian people and win their trust, how could he regain power? Vietnam has always affirmed that Pol Pot is a criminal hated by every Cambodian. Therefore, what does Vietnam have to fear about the Cambodian people giving the seat of power to Pol Pot? The right to grant the privilege to stand as candidates in elections does not belong to the Vietnamese. It is the Cambodian people who will decide.

So, Vietnam's pretended fear of Pol Pot is just a deceitful and wicked trick to dupe national and international opinion so that Vietnam can stay in Cambodia. We think that there is nothing to worry about in the possibility of some people taking power through military force. Even the Vietnamese forces, mighty as they are, let alone those of Pol Pot, cannot occupy Cambodia. The question concerns how long they can stay. Power holders in Cambodia will be those who are loved and supported by the Cambodian people and recognized by the world because no political group can conduct an isolated policy without relying on people and the international community, particularly in a small country like Cambodia.

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COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

DK'S KHIEU SAMPHAN PRAISES 'OVERSEAS COMPATRIOTS'

BK130424 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 12 Jun 86

[17 June letter from DK Vice President Khieu Samphan to "overseas compatriots"]

[Text] Esteemed and beloved compatriots: I have received the motion and signatures you sent to the Samdech president of Democratic Kampuchea, to His Excellency Son Sann, Prime Minister of the CGDK, and to me. In my capacity as DK vice president in charge of foreign affairs and through your motion and large collection of signatures, it is clear that you regard the 8-point peace proposal as your own plan stemming out of your deepest aspiration. This 8-point peace plan is a plan for our entire nation. Whether it will succeed or not depends on all of us, and not on anyone else, especially not on the Vietnamese. The latter have a strategy to swallow and incorporate our country. For this reason, they have rejected our 8-point peace plan.

However, the force of combat unity of our Cambodian nation and people, including all our compatriots living abroad, is an invincible force that can make this plan prevail over the obduracy of the expansionist and annexationist Vietnamese aggressors. In fact, if our compatriots abroad enthusiastically support this 8-point peace plan by writing support motions, collecting support signatures, explaining it to other compatriots so that they clearly understand that this plan belongs to all of us, and talking about it to all foreign friends and acquaintances, how great a force we will gather!

The fraternal members of FUNCINPEC [National United Front for an Independent, Peaceful, Neutral, and Cooperative Cambodia] support the 8-point peace plan, as do the fraternal members of the KPNLF, and those who have sympathy for the DK faction. This will be the greatest force, a force of massive, great national union in the world generated by ordinary people, mass organizations, members of small and large foreign newspapers, national and international journalists, foreign dignitaries, university and college professors, researchers, historians, diplomats, and members of parliament and government. The world's supporting force will appear in the form of motions, statements, and newspaper articles propagating

and supporting our 8-point peace plan. Therefore, this will lead to strong world public opinion bringing relentless pressure to bear on Vietnam in this situation, how much longer will the Vietnamese be able to remain stubborn since they are so deeply bogged down on the Cambodian battlefield and are experiencing a very bad predicament at home.

Vietnam stubbornly continues to refuse to negotiate with our CGDK to settle the Cambodian problem politically because it still has hope for the only way out: deceptive diplomatic maneuvers to weaken the international front supporting our people's struggle.

As for us, we have the duty to stress to the whole world that our entire Cambodian nation is united on the basis of the 8-point peace plan. Once we are united on this basis, we will have every change to exhort world public opinion into supporting our 8-point peace plan, thus driving Vietnam into a corner and preventing it from fooling the world. Then, it will be forced to sit at the negotiating table with our CGDK.

Therefore, please carry on with your patriotic activities as described above even more enthusiastically and actively, pooling all your physical, moral, and mental resources to conduct activities in support of our 8-point peace plan until we achieve this plan in accordance with the profound aspirations of our people and nation and of all of you.

[Dated] Democratic Kampuchea, 7 June, 1986

[Signed] Khieu Samphan, vice president of Democratic Kampuchea in charge of foreign affairs

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COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

VOK REPORTS ON CGDK, SRV MILITARY ACTIVITIES

BK140720 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0500 GMT 14 Jun 86

[Text] BOK military sources report that many clashes between CGDK and Vietnamese forces inside Cambodia have taken place. The sources say that on 26 May, 55 combatants from the KPNLF and the Democratic Kampuchean Army ambushed and briefly harrassed 80 Vietnamese soldiers northeast of Ta Pang village in Kralanh District, Siem Reap Province. There is no report on the loss of lives during the clash.

On 2 June, 60 KPNLF soldiers ambushed Vietnamese soldiers from the 72nd Division who were protecting 4 transport trucks at Krabau village in Srei Snam District, Siem Reap Province. Two Vietnamese soldiers were killed and another three wounded. KPNLF combatants destroyed a truck.

On 2 June, 50 KPNLF soldiers clashed with 60 Vietnamese soldiers from the 75th Division at Thlok village, Kralanh District, Siem Reap Province. Following the clash, KPNLAF combatants seized a quantity of war materiel and some weapons.

On 4 June, 20 KPNLF combatants ambushed 30 Vietnamese soldiers from the 7704th dependent unit at Chranieng village, Kralanh District, Siem Reap Province, killing 1 and wounding 2 Vietnamese soldiers.

There has also been a report on the movement of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia and the draft of Cambodian people to clear brushes and build roads near the Thai-Cambodian border. The report says that on 2 June, 260 Vietnamese special forces' soldiers with heavy weaponry were dispatched on many trucks from Chheu Slap village to Srei Snam District, Siem Reap Province. On the same day, 100 Vietnamese soldiers with 2 80-mm mortars were dispatched in 3 trucks from Samraong District to Chongkal District in Oddar Meanchey Province.

Also on 2 June, 100 Vietnamese soldiers from the 75th Division were dispatched in 5 trucks towing a 12.7-mm antiaircraft gun and an 82-mm and 3 60-mm mortars from Phum Srok District to Pongro village, Phnum Srok District, Battambang Province. On the same day, a group of Vietnamese soldiers were ensuring security for the transport of war materiel and barbed wire in 10 trucks from Phnom Penh to Kompong Chhnang Province.

On 5 June, 160 fully armed soldiers from the Vietnamese 7704th dependent unit were dispatched in 8 trucks from Anlung Vil village to Sangke District, Battambang Province. At the same time, Heng Samrin puppet officials in Sangke District declared a curfew from 1800 to 0600 to prevent people from contacting one another during the night.

Recently, 500 Cambodian people were drafted from Kandal and Prey Veng Provinces to clear brushes and build an 18 km road, Route No 43, in Samlot, Battambang Province.

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COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

VODK ON INCREASED OPPOSITION AGAINST SRV AGGRESSORS

BK110420 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 10 Jun 86

[Station Commentary: "The Movement of Our Combodian People Cooperating With Our National Army in the Struggle Against the Vietnamese Enemy is Vigorously Spreading Throughout the Country"]

[Text] Currently, along with the vigorous movement of our national army struggling against the Vietnamese enemy throughout the country and the movement of our Cambodian soldiers, forced to serve the Vietnamese, to oppose the Vietnamese enemy, the movement of our people uniting and opposing the Vietnamese enemy aggressors is also vigorous and active.

The movement of our people resisting and fighting against the Vietnamese enemy aggressors is like a burning volcano everywhere throughout the country. The forms used by our people in resisting and fighting against the Vietnamese are varied. Our people cooperate with our national army in fighting the Vietnamese enemy aggressors. Everywhere our national army is operating, particularly in areas temporarily under Vietnamese control such as east of the Mekong River in the districts of Srei Santhor, Memot, Tbong Khmum, Kroch Chhma, and Kaoh Sotin in Kompong Cham Province; Chhlong District in Kratie Province; west of the Mekong River in the Districts of Cheung Prey, Kang Meas, Prey Chhor, Kompong Siem, Stoend Trang, and Chamka Leu in Kompong Cham Province; east of Phnom Penh in the districts of Khsach Kandal and Lvea Em in Kendal Province; the districts of Sithor Kandal and Peareang in Prey Veng Province; north of Phnom Penh in the districts of Muk Kampul and Ponhea Loe in Kandal Province; northwest of Phnom Penh in the districts of Udong, Thpong, Komg Pisei, and Phnum Sruoch in Kompong Speu Province; in the southwest region in the provinces of Takeo, Kampot, and around the Tonle Sap Lake and along the Tonle Sap River; and in other areas, our people have been enthusiastically assisting and supporting our national army. They have provided information and led our national army to attack the Vietnamese enemy, cooperated with our national army to destroy positions and kill Vietnamese soldiers; and vigorously taken part in dismantling Vietnamese administrative networks in communes and villages.

Our people in these zones live in hardship and suffering because of the past almost 8 years of Vietnamese aggression. They have had it up to their necks with the Vietnamese, and our national army's activities against the Vietnamese in villages and districts provide an opportunity for our compatriots to fight back against the Vietnamese enemy aggressors to free themselves and their relatives from the Vietnamese oppression. Furthermore,

our people, in cooperation with Cambodian soldiers and militiamen and administrative staff in communes and villages, who have been forced to serve the Vietnamese, have revolted and opposed the Vietnamese enemy aggressors in every way, such as opposing the Vietnamese A-5 draft plan -- which attempts to force our people to clear brush, building roads, dig trenches, and clear minefields -- by revolting against the Vietnamese and returning home. Our compatriots oppose the Vietnamese conscription plan by hiding themselves or their relatives; oppose Vietnamese plunder by uniting and chasing off the Vietnamese enemy's Vietnamization plan, and so on.

In short, our compatriots throughout the country, particularly those in zones temporarily under Vietnamese control, dare to oppose the Vietnamese enemy aggressors and are more vigorously struggling against them in every way. One reason for this is because our people are up to their neck with anger against the Vietnamese; the other reason is that the increasingly vigorous activities against the Vietnamese to dismantle Vietnamese administrative networks throughout the country of the national army are a great encouragement for our people. This represents something our people can rely on. Our people have witnessed our vigorous attacks against the Vietnamese enemy and have seen the Vietnamese difficulties in every field. Therefore, our compatriots dare to revolt against the Vietnamese. This is a new development in our struggle against the Vietnamese enemy aggressors. It is unity and cooperation of 3 forces against the Vietnamese. This has forced the Vietnamese into more difficulties and they are heading quickly down toward final defeat. This has also exposed the Vietnamese enemy's deceitful propaganda which says that the Cambodian people are supporting the Vietnamese.

The Cambodian people are determined to cooperate with our national army and Cambodian soldiers, forced to serve the Vietnamese, and struggle more vigorously against the Vietnamese enemy aggressors to inflict more severe defeats on the Vietnamese and force them into more intricate difficulties until they are compelled to negotiate to resolve the Cambodian issue politically as suggested by the CGDK's 8-point peace plan to withdraw all their forces from Cambodia in accordance with UN resolutions.

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COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

VODK COMMENTARY ON UNITY OF CGDK FACTIONS

BK070407 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 6 Jun 86

[Station Commentary: "The CGDK and the Three Cambodian Resistance Forces are Firmly United and have Vigorously Intensified Their Struggle Against the Vietnamese Aggressors"]

[Text] The CGDK factions jointly put forward an 8-point proposal for a political settlement of the Cambodian problem, and now the Vietnamese enemies are extremely isolated and have been condemned in the world community for rejecting this reasonable proposal of the CGDK. Its rejection of the CGDK proposal lays bare the true aggressive and expansionist nature of the Vietnamese enemies. The world community clearly sees that Vietnam does not want to solve the Cambodian problem through political means. To extricate themselves from the difficulties and this extreme isolation in the international arena, the Hanoi authorities have resorted to propaganda maneuvers in an attempt to reduce the influence of the CGDK's 8-point proposal. They have also carried out all kinds of tricky schemes in order to undermine the CGDK and the three Cambodian resistance forces and to whitewash their criminal, aggressive, and expansionist faces. The Vietnamese enemies have made great efforts to sow discord among the three resistance forces by spreading rumors in order to cause mutual distrust among these forces.

However, all Vietnamese maneuvers have failed. The CGDK's 8-point proposal has gained more influence. Many more countries have voiced their support for this proposal. The tripartite CGDK is more firmly united. This is because, like all Cambodian people, the tripartite CGDK is well aware of the Vietnamese maneuvers. All CGDK factions realize the danger of the Vietnamese acts of aggression, expansion, annexation, and race extermination -- the real danger menacing the survival of Cambodia and the Khmer race. Through experience, our CGDK factions realize that in these circumstances, with the Vietnamese enemies massacring our Cambodian people and attempting to annex our territory to Vietnam, only by uniting firmly and jointly fighting the Vietnamese aggressors will we be able to protect our beloved country and race. This is why all of us have placed national unity above all else. We do not do anything that will harm the great national union. On the contrary, we have strengthened and expanded our great national union and intensified all forms of struggle diplomatically and militarily against the Vietnamese aggressors.

In the diplomatic field, the CGDK recently sent a joint delegation led by Vice President Khieu Samphan to visit a number of African countries. The visit was a great success; we have gained greater sympathy and support for our people's just struggle against the Vietnamese aggressors. The visit also reflected the internal unity of the CGDK in jointly launching diplomatic activities against the Vietnamese aggressors.

In the military field, the forces of the three CGDK factions have increased their cooperation in fighting more vigorously against the Vietnamese enemies on the battlefield. We have set up two new coordinating committees in charge of military activities and information and propaganda affairs in order to effectively intensify our struggle against the Vietnamese aggressors.

During the meeting of the CGDK's coordinating committee in charge of national defense on 28 May, the participants noted the development of our struggle against the Vietnamese aggressors in both the military and diplomatic fields. At this meeting, the three CGDK factions unanimously agreed to constantly coordinate their activities in carrying on their military, political, and diplomatic struggle until final victory. Therefore, the CGDK and the three Cambodian resistance forces have not split up. On the contrary, they have become more firmly united. All of this clearly shows that no matter how hard they have tried, the Vietnamese enemies have failed to fulfill their design to undermine unity among the CGDK factions and the three Cambodian resistance forces. On the contrary, the CGDK factions and the three Cambodian resistance forces have become more closely united, improved understanding, and intensified their joint offensive against the Vietnamese aggressors. They will continue to unite and intensify their coordinated activities against the Vietnamese aggressor until they realize the goals defined in the statement on the establishment of the CGDK issued in Kuala Lumpur on 22 June 1982, that is, until all Vietnamese aggressors are driven out of our Cambodian territory.

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CSO: 4212/84

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

VOK REPORTS SRV TROOP MOVEMENTS IN MAY

BK090720 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0500 GMT 9 Jun 86

[Text] The Voice of the Khmer newsroom has received several reports on the deployment of the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin troops and the dispatch of many tanks to the border area in May.

According to these reports, on 23 May 200 Vietnamese soldiers and 200 Heng Samrin soldiers escorted by 4 T-54 tanks and 4 105-mm artillery pieces were sent to Tonsay Reak village, Samraong District, Oddar Meanchey Province. On 27 May, a number of Vietnamese soldiers and 20 T-54 tanks were sent to take up positions in various areas along Route 68 stretching from Samraong District to O Smach village in Oddar Meanchey Province. On 22 May, 350 Heng Samrin soldiers armed with light weapons were sent to reinforce the 41st Regiment of the 3d Division stationed in Chroeung, Trapeang Tav, and Ta Veng in Rovieng District of Oddar Meanchey Province. On 24 May, a number of fully-armed Vietnamese soldiers escorted 60 innocent Cambodians being sent to work in Trapeang Tav, Rovieng District, Oddar Meanchey Province.

The Vietnamese have sent more Vietnamese troops from the 72d, 9th, 59th, and 75th Divisions and the Heng Samrin soldiers, including the special independent units No 7,704 and No 7,705 which are psychological warfare units, to fight against the CGDK forces in Srei Snam, Varin, Kralanh, and Puok Districts of Siem Reap Province and in various areas around the Tonle Sap Lake. However, most of these reinforcements died from illness or were killed during the vigorous attacks launched by the CGDK forces. Others fled from the areas.

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COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

VONADK SAYS CHHUK DISTRICT SEAT ATTACKED 29 MAY

BK050151 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 4 Jun 86

[Reports from Various Battlefields]

[Excerpts] Kampot battlefield: On the night of 29 May, our national army launched a 5-pronged attack against Chhuk district seat. The first prong attacked the Vietnamese command post south of Chhuk market; the second prong attacked the Vietnamese company west and south of the market; the third prong attacked along Route 3 toward the sawmill and the rice mill; the fourth prong attacked along Route 3 from the west toward the Vietnamese police station and prison; and the fifth attacked from north of Route 3 toward the gasoline depot. After a 15 minute battle, we completely controlled this district seat. We killed 30 Vietnamese enemy soldiers on the spot and wounded 25 others. Among the dead were two Vietnamese district officials, a director of the Vietnamese army training school, and a Vietnamese prison director. We freed 50 people imprisoned by the Vietnamese enemy. We destroyed a machine gun, 3 light machine guns, 3 B-40's, 15 AK's, 5 AR-15's, a C-25 radio, a district seat, a big rice mill, 40 barracks, a Vietnamese house, a prison, a sawmill, 10,000 liters of gasoline, 5 vehicles, 5 motorcyles, 15 bicycles, a generator, 3 telephones, 250 sacks of paddy, and some war materiel. We seized a machine gun, five AK's, two SK's, four AR-15's two pistols, a telephone, and some war materiel.

South Sisophon battlefield: On 30 May, 11 Vietnamese trucks transporting materiel from Bavtoekk Sap [Battambang Province] were ambushed by our forces at O Kanhchos. We destroyed 2 trucks on the spot; killed 10 and wounded 40 Vietnamese enemy soldiers; and seized 2 AK's.

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COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

CGDK SPOKESMAN CONDEMNS SOUTH AFRICA, APARTHEID

BK140222 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 14 Jun 86

[13 June "Statement by Spokesman of the CGDK Foreign Ministry Condemning Renewal of State of Emergency in South Africa"]

[Text] The Cambodian people and the CGDK are very concerned about the new, serious situation in South Africa caused by the apartheid regime, and express their vehement anger over the fact that the Pretoria racist regime has intensified oppression, suppression, arrest, and bloodshed in a large scale against the anti-apartheid people after renewing its state of emergency as of 12 June 1986.

The Cambodian people and the CGDK vehemently condemn these crimes of the Pretoria administration and demand that it immediately lift this state of emergency and put an immediate end to its abject apartheid policy.

As the world's conference to discuss measures against the South African racist regime is drawing near, the Cambodian people and the CGDK, together with the entire world community, call on all concerned to take all kinds of measures in order to quickly end the apartheid regime.

On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the 16 June massacre in Soweto, the Cambodian people would like to pay homage to the souls of the students in Soweto and all other heroes of the South African people who sacrificed their lives in the struggle to eliminate the apartheid regime. The Cambodian people would like to also reiterate their fraternal solidarity with and firm support for this just struggle for the right to live with honor as human-being in a democratic and unified South African society which is free from racial discrimination and in which all people can freely decide their own destiny.

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COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

DK RED CROSS CONDEMNS SRV SHELLING, PRACTICES

BK060813 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 5 Jun 86

[5 June statement by the Red Cross of Democratic Kampuchea -- read by announcer]

[Text] On 29 May, 1986, at 0800, when the people were having breakfast in their homes, the Vietnamese forces occupying Cambodia fired many 105- and 120-mm artillery shells into the Cambodian refugee camp at Ta Ngok, codenamed Site 8, in Prachinburi Province, Thailand, killing 20 people, most of them women and children, seriously wounding 30, and slightly injuring several others. The people at Ta Ngok camp, like tens of thousands of other Cambodian war refugees, have escaped on several occasions from repeated attacks by the Vietnamese aggressor forces inside Cambodia. Each family of these war refugees is a victim of the atrocities and savagery of the Vietnamese aggressor troops. A number of families were completely wiped out. Now the stone-hearted Hanoi aggressor authorities have pursued and massacred them even on the soil of the Kingdom of Thailand. This is another genocidal crime of the Vietnamese enemy aggressors in addition to the heinous crimes perpetrated on countless occasions against the innocent Cambodian people in line with their strategic policy of exterminating the Cambodian people in order to incorporate Cambodia into their ignominious Indochinese federation.

The Red Cross of Democratic Kampuchea categorically and most indignantly denounces and condemns this latest crime of genocide committed by the Hanoi aggressors. On this occasion, the Red Cross of Democratic Kampuchea would like to express regret that certain persons in a number of humanitarian organizaitons, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, had too hastily spread the unfortunate news about the shelling, thus confusing world public opinion and preventing it from clearly seeing the flagrant and filthy crime of the Hanoi aggressors and from grasping their blatant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Thailand.

On the same occasion, the Red Cross of Democratic Kampuchea vehemently denounces and condemns the Hanoi aggressors for intensifying genocidal crimes against Cambodia in all forms, at an increasing tempo, and with greater cruelty and savagery at the end of the 8th dry season and the

beginning of the 8th rainy season, 1986. If they did not hesitate to massacre Cambodian civilian refugees in Thai territory in broad daylight, would they hesitate to massacre those people who are under their heel inside Cambodia? Not only have they violated the most elementary of human rights, but they have also arbitrarily arrested, jailed, tortured, and massacred innocent Cambodians. They continue to round up people of both sexes all year round and force them to leave their homes, villages, and lands and to work in corvee serving their war of aggression -- clearing brush, building roads, erecting defense walls, and setting up military networks in the malaria-infested western border region of Cambodia according to their ignominious K-5 plan.

Moreover, they have forced these covee workers to be the shield for their troops, walking through fields of mines and punji stakes and bearing the brunt of enemy fire on the battlefield. As a result, thousands of these persons died, caught malaria, went hungry, or were wounded by landmines or bullets. They continue to use biochemical weapons banned by the 17 June 1925 Geneva protocol and the 1972 convention. At the same time, they continue to ship Vietnamese citizens from Vietnam to Cambodia where they are allowed to take permanent residence in fertile regions in gross violation of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, whose article 49 stipulates: Foreign forces have no right to send their people to take residence in the land of the occupied country.

More cruel and savage still, before sending prisoners to the gallows, the Vietnamese aggressors bleed them of all their blood to be used for treatment of their wounded or very sick soldiers.

The Red Cross of Democratic Kampuchea would like to appeal to all national Red Cross organizations, national Red Crescent organizations, and other international humanitarian organizations to closely look at the extremely painful incident described above and to denounce and condemn all the savage and brutal crimes of the Hanoi aggressor authorities. Please, take all necessary concrete measures to stay their blood-stained hands in time, preventing them from committing new crimes against the innocent Cambodian people. In this sense, the Red Cross of Democratic Kampuchea would like to appeal to these organizations to join with the international community in continuing bringing pressure to bear on the Hanoi aggressor authorities in the field of humanitarian aid in order to force them to put an immediate end to their genocidal war of aggression against Cambodia by agreeing to negotiate with the CGDK to settle the Cambodian question politically according to the CGDK's 8-point peace proposal. Only by having the Hanoi authorities withdraw all their aggressor troops from Cambodia and allow the Cambodian people to determine their own destiny can peace be restored in Cambodia and can the Cambodian people, as well as the Vietnamese people, be saved from ruination, suffering, misery, and all kinds of woes they have painfully endured for the past 7 and 1/2 years.

[Signed] the Red Cross of Democratic Kampuchea

[Dated] Democratic Kampuchea, 5 June 1986

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COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

CGDK DEFENSE COMMITTEE MEETS 28 MAY

BK300600 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0500 GMT 30 May 86

[Text] A meeting of the three ministers in charge of the CGDK's Coordinating Committee for National Defense was held on 28 May in the presence of His Excellency Son Sann, prime minister of the CGDK, to examine Cambodia's political and military situation.

A statement issued by the Committee following the meeting expressed satisfaction at the progress achieved in the military, political, and diplomatic fields during the past 2 months. In the diplomatic field, more than 40 countries have already lent their support to the CGDK's 8-point peace proposal advanced on 17 March.

The statement also noted that the meeting pointed out that Vietnam's propaganda on the troop withdrawal from Cambodia was deceitful. It said that this so-called withdrawal was simply an annual rotation of troops.

The statement went on to say that this year the Hanoi authorities have sent two new divisions to Cambodia in their stepped-up design to occupy the country in the face of increasing attacks by the CGDK.

It revealed that the setting up of the two new coordinating committees for military activities and for information and press last April has strengthened the struggle of the CGDK and the Khmer people for national liberation.

The meeting formulated a number of principles regarding the functions of the two committees. The statement concluded by noting that the three factions of the CGDK unanimously decided to further strengthen their coordinating actions to pursue their struggle in all fields -- military, political, and diplomatic -- until final victory.

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COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

VOK DENOUNCES SRV 'LIES' ON CAMP SHELLING

BK090920 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0500 GMT 9 Jun 86

[Station Commentary: "The Vietnamese and Their Substandard Lies"]

[Text] When Vietnam shelled the Cambodian civilian refugee camp on 29 May, world opinion massively condemned and castigated it because this civilian camp was located on Thai territory and under the supervision and support of UN humanitarian organizations. Thailand lodged a protest with the United Nations, claiming that this savage, inhuman act committed by Vietnamese forces in massacring innocent Cambodian people was a blatant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thailand. A number of other countries also vehemently condemned Vietnam, embarassing it before public opinion. In order to cover up its ignominy, Vietnam's radio and the radio of the Phnom Penh regime vociferously proclaimed that the attack was not carried out by Vietnamese forces; instead, it was the DK forces which fired at the camp. In making this allegation, Vietnam did not even think rationally, because it was in a great hurry as a result of the strong moral pressure of world opinion.

Ammunition experts subsequently found out that the shells used in the bombardment were of a type never used by DK combatants. Irrefutable evidence showed that the shell fragments came from Vietnamese forces in the 59th division which was positioned in Poipet District, Battambang Province. This shelling was intended to push the Cambodian refugee camp -- already 4-5 km from the Cambodian border --even deeper into Thai territory so as to increase the burden for the Royal Thai Government -- which has always shown pity for the Cambodian people and has allowed them to live in its country -- and also to further increase the burden on the UN humanitarian organizations.

However, this savage act prompted the Royal Thai Government to summon the SRV ambassador to admonish him. During his talks with SRV Deputy Foreign Minister Hoang Bich Son in Bangkok, Thai Deputy Foreign Minister Arun Phanuphong also cautioned the Vietnamese minister, caught unprepared by such glaring evidence, instead shifted the blame onto Heng Samrin soldiers. This blame-shifting tactic did not benefit Vietnam. On the contrary, it has caused much furor, for it is public knowledge that all Heng Samrin soldiers are under the command of Vietnam, and it is pointless for the Heng Samrin

soldiers to fire at and kill their own compatriots. This statement has had an unhappy effect on the Heng Samrin soldiers and it might cause a fierce reaction. For this reason, Hoang Bich Son tried unsuccessfully to change his story by asserting that it was not the Heng Samrin soldiers who had fired the shots. Who then fired them? It was Vietnam itself. Vietnam tried hard to make cunning lies, yet these lies were so transparent that they brought a net loss to their originators. Vietnam should learn anew how to tell lies, for the Cambodian people are no fools.

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COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

ROUNDUP OF VONADK BATTLE REPORTS

30 May - 5 June Period

BK060755 [Editorial Report] (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian broadcast the following battle reports during the reporting period 30 May - 5 June.

At 2315 GMT on 30 May, VONADK reports that between 22 and 27 May, DK forces on the north Sisophon, western Leach, Koh Kong Leu, south Sisophon, Battambang, and Moung-Pursat battlefields killed or wounded 111 Vietnamese enemy soldiers; destroyed 27 assorted guns, 4 trucks, an ammunition depot, 32 barracks, 240 meters of railroad track, and some ammunition and war materiel; and seized some ammunition and war materiel.

On 31 May at 2315 GMT, VONADK says that between 21 and 27 May, DK forces on the Samlot, south Sisophon, Moung, Kompong Speu, Kompong Cham, and west Battambang battlefields killed or wounded 62 enemy soldiers; destroyed 5 guns, 2 trucks, a telecommunications office, 2 commune offices, 240 meters of railroad track, and some war materiel; and liberated 3 villages on the Kompong Cham battlefield.

In a report broadcast at 2315 GMT on 1 June, VONADK says that between 9 and 29 May, DK forces on the Kampot, Koh Kong Leu, Oddar Meanchey, Kompong Thom, northwest Phnom Penh, Moung, south Sisophon, Tonle Sap, and Kompong Cham battlefields killed 22 and wounded 30 enemy soldiers; dismantled administrative networks in 2 communes and 7 villages; destroyed 13 weapons, a commune office, 50 meters of railroad track; and liberated 3 villages on the Kompong Thom battlefield and 2 villages on the Kompong Cham battlefield.

On 2 June at 2315 GMT, VONADK reports that between 13 and 31 May, DK forces on the Peam Ta, northwest Phnom Penh, Kompong Chhnang, Battambang, Moung, south Sisophon, Kompong Som, Leach, Kompong Thom, and Chhep battlefields killed 49 and wounded 53 enemy soldiers; dismantled administrative networks in 2 communes and 7 villages; destroyed 17 weapons, 2 motorboats, 4 boats, a barrack, and some ammunition and war materiel; seized some war materiel; and liberated 3 villages on the Kompong Chhnang battlefield.

According to a VONADK report broadcast at 2315 GMT on 3 June, between 28 and 31 May, DK forces on the Pailin, Kompong Chhnang, and Chhep battlefields

killed 22 and wounded 20 enemy soldiers and destroyed 6 weapons, a truck, and some war materiel at 5 GMT on 4 June, RONADK reports that between 20 and 30 May, DK forces on the north Sisophong, Kompong Chhnang, Takeo, Pursat, Battambang, and Kampot battlefield killed 81 and wounded 121 enemy soldiers; attacked 2 townships; dismantled administrative networks in 3 communes and 7 villages; destroyed 36 assorted weapons, 3 big rice mills, a sawmill, a district office, 2 commune offices, a Vietnamese house, a prison, 10,000 liters of gasoline, 10 vehicles, a generator, a C-25 radio, 53 barracks, and some ammunition and war materiel; and liberated 5 villages on the Takeo battlefield, 3 villages on the Pursat battlefield, and 10 villages and 50 people on the Kampot battlefield.

On 5 June at 2315 GMT, VONADK reports that between 15 May and 2 June, DK forces on the Siem Reap, Kompong Cham, south Battambang, west Battambang, Peam Ta, Koh Kong Leu, and south Sisophon battlefields killed 47 and wounded 62 enemy soldiers; dismantled administrative networks in a commune and 5 villages; destroyed 19 weapons, 2 barracks, and a 10-meter bridge; and liberated 3 villages on the Kompong Thom battlefield.

6 - 12 June Period

BK131035 [Editorial Report] (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian broadcast the following battle reports during the reporting period 6 - 12 June:

At 2315 GMT on 6 June, VONADK reports that between 16 May and 1 June, DK forces on the Kompong Thom, Kompong Cham, south Sisophon, Siem Reap, west Battambang, north Sisophon, and Chhep battlefields killed or wounded 147 Vietnamese enemy soldiers, and destroyed the administrative networks in 13 village along with 20 guns, a truck, some ammunition, and war materiel.

In a report broadcast at 2315 GMT on 7 June, VONADK says that between 27 May and 4 June, DK forces on the Takeo, south Sisophone, Peam Ta, Samlot, Koh Kong Leu, north Sisophong, and Kompong Thom battlefields killed or wounded 203 enemy soldiers; dismantled administrative networks in 6 villages; destroyed 93 assorted guns, 3 trucks, a C-25 radio, and some ammunition and materiel; and seized 7 guns and some ammunition and war materiel.

According to VONADK at 2315 GMT on 8 June, between 29 May and 3 June, DK forces on the Kompong Cham, Kompong Thom, Kompong Chhnang, Tonle Sap, Pursat, Moung, and Kompong Som battlefields killed or wounded 37 Vietnamese soldiers; dismantled administrative netowrks in a commune and 5 villages; destroyed 2 guns, a truck, and some ammunition and war materiel; seized 3 guns and some ammunition and war materiel; and liberated 7 villages and 50 people on the Kompong Thom battlefield.

In a report broadcast at 2315 GMT on 9 June, VONADK says that between 26 May and 6 June, DK forces on the Pailin, Kampot, Kompong Cham, east Battambang, south Sisophong, and Kampot battlefields killed 19 and wounded 28 enemy soldiers; attacked a township; dismantled administrative

networks in a commune and 5 villages; destroyed 2 guns, a truck, and some ammunition and war materiel; seized 3 guns and some ammunition and war materiel; and liberated 7 villages and 50 people on the Kompong Thom battlefield.

In a report broadcast at 2315 GMT on 9 June, VONADK says that between 26 May and 6 June, DK forces on the Pailin, Kampot, Kompong Cham, east Battambang, south Sisophong, and Kampot battlefields killed 19 and wounded 28 enemy soldiers; attacked a township; dismantled administrative networks in 2 communes and 4 villages; destroyed a gun, 5 large rice mills, a small rice mill, a generator, a paddy and material warehouse, and some ammunition and war materiel; seized a gun and some ammunition and war materiel; and liberated 6 villages on the Kampot battlefield and 2 villages on the east Battambang battlefield.

At 2315 GMT on 10 June, VONADK broadcast a report saying that between 2 and 7 June, DK forces on the north Sisophon, south Sisophon, Koh Kong Leu, and Kompong Som battlefields killed 28 and wounded 34 enemy soldiers; dismantled Vietnamese administrative networks in 3 villages; destroyed 10 guns, a truck, and some ammunition and war materiel; and seized 3 weapons and some ammunition and war materiel.

According to a report broadcast by VONADK at 2315 GMT on 11 June, between 1 and 6 June, DK forces on the Kompong Thom, Siem Reap, Kampot, Kompong Speu, Kompong Cham, Leach, Moung-Pursat, Takeo, and Peam Ta battlefields killed 51 and wounded 55 enemy soldiers; dismantled administrative networks in 2 communes and 14 villages; destroyed 21 assorted guns, a telecommunications office, a commune office, a barrack, and some ammunition and materiel; seized 16 guns and some ammunition and war materiel; and freed 20 Cambodian soldiers on the Kompong Thom battlefield.

At 2315 GMT on 12 June, VONADK reports that between 29 May and 10 June, DK forces on the north Battambang, Kompong Thom, Siem, Reap, Samlot, south Sisophon, Koh Kong Leu, Chhep-Thalabarivat, and Oddar Meanchey battlefields killed or wounded 180 enemy soldiers; captured a township, a commune, and 5 villages; destroyed 27 assorted guns, 2 trucks, 5 motorcycles, 5 bicycles, 1 walkie-talkie, a sewing machine, and 6 barracks; and liberated 6 villages on the north Battambang battlefield.

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COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

KHIEU SAMPHAN SENDS GREETINGS TO PHILIPPINES' LAUREL

BK130419 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 12 Jun 86

[10 June Greetings Message from DK Vice President in charge of foreign affairs Khieu Samphan to Philippine Vice President, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister Salvadore Laurel]

[Text] To His Excellency Salvadore Laurel
Vice President, Prime Minister, and Minister of Foreign Affairs
The Republic of the Philippines
Manila

Excellency, on the solemn occasion of the 88th anniversary of Independence Day of the Republic of the Philippines, I am honored and happy to express on behalf of the Cambodian people and the CGDK and in my own name our warmest congratulations and best wishes for more and more brilliant successes, prosperity, and glory to you and, through you, to the people of the Philippines.

I take this excellent opportunity to express once again our deepest thanks to you and to the friendly Philippine Government and people for always according firm and unswerving support and assistance to the national liberation and race-preserving cause of the Cambodian people and the CGDK against foreign aggression and occupation. When receiving a delegation of the CGDK in Manila on 4 April, 1986, on behalf of the ASEAN countries, Your Excellency reaffirmed this righteous stand, especially by supporting the CGDK's 8-point proposal for a political settlement of the Cambodian problem. This just and generous attitude has greatly encouraged the Cambodian people and my national army fighting directly on the battlefield. It has also invaluably contributed to the search for peace in Cambodia and to guaranteeing peace and stability in Southeast Asia, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world as a whole. For that, I would like to express heartfelt gratitude to you and the Philippine Government and, through you and the Philippine Government, to all other friendly ASEAN countries.

With confidence that the traditional bonds of friendship and cooperation linking our two countries and peoples since time immemorial will surely further develop and strengthen in the future, I ask Your Excellency to please accept my highest regards.

[Dated] Democratic Kampuchea, 10 June, 1986

[Signed] Khieu Samphan
Vice President of Democratic Kampuchea in charge of foreign affairs

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COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

BRIEFS

HASANI THANKS SIHANOUK--Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of Democratic Kampuchea: Your kind congratulations sent me on the occasion of my election as president of the SFRY Presidency very much touched me. Along with warm thanks, I would like to express to you best wishes for your own happiness and that of the friendly Cambodian people in the struggle for national liberation. [Signed] Sinan Hasani, president of the SFRY Presidency. [Text] [(Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 4 Jun 86 BK] /12624

SAMPHAN RETURNS FROM AFRICAN TOUR--After visiting a number of African countries -- Egypt, Kenya, Rwenda, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Liberia, and Guinea -- The CGDK delegation led by Khieu Samphan, DK vice president in charge of foreign affairs, returned home on 3 June. Vice President Khieu Samphan brought back the friendship, assistance, and support of the people and governments of these friendly countries to the Cambodian people and the CGDK, particularly support for and assistance to the CGDK's 8-point peace plan to resolve the Cambodian issue politically. The friendship, assistance, and support of these seven friendly countries, along with the assistance and support of other friendly countries the world over, are an encouragement for our national army, the Cambodian people, and the CGDK in the struggle for national liberation and are an important force to compel the Vietnamese enemy to hold talks with the CGDK to resolve the Cambodian issue politically on the basis of the CGDK's 8-point peace proposal. [Text] [(Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 5 Jun 86 BK] /12624

CGDK ATTACKS ON SRV TROOPS--VOK has received reports that CGDK combatants have attacked Vietnamese troops in the provinces of Battambang, Siem Reap, and Oddar Meanchey, killing 16 and wounding 7 Vietnamese soldiers. Two CGDK combatants were killed and another two wounded. On 29 May, 55 combatants from the KPNLF and the ANS cooperated in attacking 30 Vietnamese soldiers from the 72nd Division at Ta Pang village, about 1 km from Kralanh District, Siem Reap Province. Three Vietnamese soldiers were killed. On 30 May, Vietnamese forces from the 479th Command used three armed (HMI) helicopters to attack a position of the ANS at O Prek Hev village in Sangke District, Battambang Province. The attack lasted 10 minutes. There have been no reports yet on the losses of lives among the ANS. On 22 May, 80 combatants

from the KPNLF cooperated with 40 soldiers from the Democratic Kampuchean side in attacking a position of the Vietnamese army's 7704th dependent unit guarded by 90 soldiers in Kompong Siem village, Sangke District, Battambang Province. Three Vietnamese soldiers were killed and five others were wounded. The CGDK forces suffered one dead and two wounded. [Excerpts] [(Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0500 GMT 11 Jun 86 BK] /12624

USSR, SRV CHEMICAL WEAPONS CHARGE--United States, British, and Canadian researchers on biochemical weapons have found concrete evidence proving that the Soviet Union and Vietnam have used toxic chemical weapons in their war of aggression and expansion in Laos and Cambodia. The researchers cited evidence from various sources, such as intelligence sources, refugees, journalists, and actual events. These researchers, such as Mr (Mirotha) and Mr (Gregory) of the United States and Mr (Konostowa) of Canada, have confirmed similar evidence concerning the use of chemical weapons in Laos and Cambodia by the Vietnamese-Soviet aggressors. On the Cambodian battlefield, the Vietnamese aggressors used toxic chemical weapons in various ways, such as spreading toxic chemicals over water sources and plants, firing toxic shells through artillery pieces, and spraying toxic chemicals over areas from aircraft. [Text] [(Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 13 Jun 86 BK] /12624

SRV TROOP MOVEMENTS, CORVEE LABOR--The Voice of the Khmer has received reports on the movements of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia and the sending of innocent Cambodian people for hard labor in the border regions. The reports revealed that on 1 June, two Vietnamese trucks loaded with Vietnamese soldiers and a truck transporting mines left Samraong District, Oddar Meanchey Province, traveled through Kop village along Highway 691, and headed toward the Cambodian-Thai border. On the same day, 100 Vietnamese soldiers of the 9th Division were sent on 5 trucks from Nimit village, Poipet District, to Sereisaophoan District, Battambang Province. On 2 June, 80 Vietnamese soldiers of the 179th Division were sent on five trucks from Sereisaophoan District to Sala Krau village, Sereisaophoan District, Battambang Province. On 5 June, 1986, 100 Vietnamese soldiers from the 59th Division were sent on 5 trucks from Nam Sap village, Poipet District, to Bavel village, Mongkolborei District, Battambang Province. At the same time, a number of well-armed Vietnamese soldiers mobilized 600 innocent Cambodian civilians from Samraong District to Trapeang Tau and Ph'ong villages in the same district of Oddar Meanchey Province where they were forced to clear forest, dig trenches, and plant mines there. [Text] [(Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0500 GMT 13 Jun 86 BK] /12624

SRV, HENG SAMRIN TROOP MOVEMENTS--It was reported that on 18 May, 8,000 Heng Samrin troops were sent from Battambang Province to Sot Nikom, Chikreng, Banteay Srei, and Phnum Kulen Districts and to Angkor Wat in Siem Reap Province. On the same day, 3,000 Vietnamese troops were sent from Phnom Penh to Battambang Province. On 15 May, a number of Vietnamese troops transported 1 metric ton of Soviet-made mines and chemicals from Phnom Penh to Battambang Province. On 20 May, 100 Vietnamese soldiers were sent from Pongro village, Srei Snam District, Siem Reap Province, and another 100 from Kamping Puoy village, Phnum Srok District, Battambang Province, to Chrouy Neang Muon village, Srei Snam District, Siem Reap Province. On 22 May, two platoons of Vietnamese troops from the 75th Brigade were sent from Thmar Puok District to Sisophon District by truck pulling 105-mm artillery pieces. On 26 May, 160 Vietnamese soldiers were sent from Nimit village to Sisophon District, Battambang Province. [Text] [(Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0500 GMT 5 Jun 86 BK] /12624

CSO: 4212/84

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

BOU THANG ATTENDS CHILDREN'S DAY GET-TOGETHER

BK051429 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1200 GMT 5 Jun 86

[Text] Joining with the children throughout the country in celebrating the 36th anniversary of the International Children's Day, a children's get-together was held at the defense ministry guest house in the afternoon of 3 June in the presence of Comrade Bou Thang, Political Bureau member and minister of national defense. Also present on this occasion were Comrade Meas Kroch, deputy defense minister; Comrade Chieng Am, deputy chief of the General Logistics Department; and teachers and parents of the children in the three general departments of the Defense Ministry.

Speaking on this occasion, Comrade Chieng Am stressed the meaning of the International Children's Day. He said: This commemorative day was marked after the heinous crimes of Hiterite fascism against the people and the children of Lidice in Czechoslovakia and Oradour in France, crimes that will never be forgotten nor forgiven by mankind the world over. Fascism collapsed in 1945 thanks to the heroic armed forces of the Soviet Union. In January 1949, the Women's International Democratic Federation meeting in Moscow decided to observe 1 June of every year as the International Children's Day.

Addressing the get-together, Comrade Meas Kroch, deputy defense minister, urged the teachers and parents of the children of the national defense ministry to take good care of the children and enable them to create achievements in contribution to national defense and reconstruction in the future. He said: I urge you, dear children, to maintain solidarity with the children of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Laos, and other fraternal socialist countries in the world, striving in a joint struggle for peace in human society.

Phen Sopheak, representing the boys and girls of the Defense Ministry's kindergarten, took the floor to pledge to do as they were urged to do and to learn hard to become good children, good sons, good daughters, good students, and good friends of the nation.

This get-together ended in a joyous atmosphere. Sweets and toys were also distributed to all the children.

/12624
CSO: 4212/85

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

CHEA BOTH ADDRESSES GOODS INSPECTION MEETING

BK170755 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 17 Jun 86

[Text] A meeting to sum up the outcome of goods and material inspection campaign and to open a new campaign on goods and material inspection throughout the country was held at the Chattomuk Conference Hall on the morning of 17 June. Presiding over the meeting were Comrade Chea Both, member of the party Central Committee Political Bureau, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, and minister of planning; and Comrade Mat Ly, member of the party Central Committee Political Bureau, vice chairman of the National Assembly, and chairman of the Kampuchean Federation of Trade Unions. Attending the meeting were the comrades leaders of various ministries and offices, representatives of the committees for inspecting goods and materials attached to all ministries, and offices, and directors of all central, municipal, and provincial departments.

In his opening speech, Comrade Chea Soth noted the priority and the efforts made in the inspection of goods and materials throughout the country. He pointed out a number of achievements and failures for use as a lesson to improve future tasks in accordance with the requirements of the party and state. At the same time, the comrade exhorted all participants to grasp all advice and new targets for implementation in the coming campaign.

/12624
CSO: 4212/85

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

KIM YIN RECEIVES HUNGARIAN TELEVISION EQUIPMENT

BK060256 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 2300 GMT 5 Jun 86

[Text] On the afternoon of 4 June, at the Cambodian television station, a ceremony was solemnly organized to hand over a live-broadcast truck from the Hungarian People's Republic television service to the PRK directorate for radio and television. The gift consists of a live-broadcast truck, four cameras, and some other equipment.

On this occasion, Comrade Janos Zagyi, acting charge d'affaires of the Hungarian Embassy to the PRK, highly appreciated every brilliant victory of the Cambodian revolution for the past more than 7 years in defending and building the country in every field. The comrade highly valued the all-round cooperation between Hungary and Cambodia, which has been expanded and strengthened. Hungary has provided all kinds of assistance in the field of propaganda and dissemination. The comrade affirmed that the entire Hungarian party, government, and people pledge to stand beside the Cambodian revolution, cooperating with it and providing all kinds of assistance and support in the spirit of proletarian internationalist mutual assistance.

Replying, Comrade Kim Yin, member of the party Central Committee and director general of the Cambodian radio and television, highly appreciated the precious gift of the Hungarian party, government, and people for facilitating the task of disseminating pictures to the Cambodian people. The comrade expressed most profound gratitude to the delegation of the Hungarian television and the Hungarian party and government for bringing the equipment and many specialists and specialists and technicians to assist Cambodian television.

Finally, Comrade Kim Yin and Comrade Janos Zagyi cut the inaugural ribbon, inspected the live broadcast truck, and signed documents transferring the equipment in a happy and most cordial atmosphere.

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CSO: 4212/85

PHACHEACHON EXPLAINS DISTRIBUTION OF FARM MATERIALS

BK120823 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 2300 GMT 11 Jun 86

[PRACHEACHON Editorial: "Supply Farm Materials in Time for the Rainy-Season Production Campaign"]

[Text] Farm materials include, chemical fertilizer, pesticide, fuel oil, seeds, and production equipment. They are necessary, indispensible factors for agricultural production. Implementing the plan of supplying farm materials well is regarded as having contributed to winning production control for the locality.

Over the past few years, the work of supplying materials for agriculture has made a great effort to mobilize technical materials available at home and equipment received from friendly countries and international organizations and distribute them to production localities in order to introduce modern sciences and technology into agriculture in a move toward serving intensive cropping and the increase of rice and other crop production. At present, the need for the use of new strains, fertilizer, pesticide, fuel oil, and various agricultural machines has steadily grown throughout the country. In the past, the supply of equipment and materials remained difficult. First of all, the quantity of local and imported materials remained limited and could not be supplied on a regular and timely basis for production. The transportation and orientation, the concentration of investment money and the building of technical basis in major rice and other crop regions throughout the country remained short of targets. The relations between departments and levels were not well synchronized in resolving the question of supplying materials for agriculture. The losses and waste during transport operations were also high, and so on.

Despite all the above-mentioned shortcomings, the supply work made a great effort to provide more than 91 percent of the plan of supplying chemical fertilizer in the 1985 rainy season, or 5,550 metric tons more than in 1984, and 100 percent of rice seeds was supplied to the localities in the 1985 plan.

It is imperative to organize and control firmly the work of supplying necessary technical materials for agriculture and see to it that available materials are properly distributed. Moreover, it is imperative to seek and

exploit locally existing sources of technical materials and exhort the people to make use of these sources of materials in the localities, such as natural fertilizer and compost and to use waterwheels, scoops, and buckets for irrigation without relying on water pumps which consume too much fuel oil. It is imperative to pay attention to learning from past experience about the distribution of production tools and materials. Distribute them well and more properly and suitably than before, constantly keeping in mind the practice of thrift.

In case the supply is untimely and falls short of target, it is imperative to inform the localities immediately so that they can quickly look for farm materials from alternative sources, thus avoiding untoward effects on production as a whole. It is imperative to eliminate the type of middlemen who thrive on embezzling and diverting state-owned technical materials for agriculture. In order to increase the amount of food earmarked by the Fifth National Party Congress, we must increase investment on agriculture, promoting the locally available technical materials and importing necessary materials such as chemical fertilizer, pesticide, and agricultural machines that we cannot produce themselves.

In distributing necessary materials, the shortest way should be taken by directly transporting them to provinces, districts, communes, villages, and solidarity groups, thus reducing expenses on transportation and rendering distribution more thorough and rapid than before.

Close cooperation between the Agricultural Department and the transport service should be promoted in using railways, highways, and especially water ways to ensure the timely distribution of farm materials. To supply materials in time for the current rainy-season rice producing campaign, the service in charge of supplying agricultural materials must contact other sections at the central and grass-roots levels in order to correctly grasp the demand in quantity, quality, and type of materials. It is imperative to organize the protection of materials. See to it that none of them is lost or damaged. In particular, it is imperative to provide materials in appropriate quantities for largely rich growing provinces and provinces with farm produces and other goods. Successfully increasing production depends on good supply of technical materials for agriculture.

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CSO: 4212/85

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

REPORTS ISSUED ON AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS

2-8 June Period

BK090430 [Editorial Report] Cambodian media monitored by Bangkok Bureau carried the following reports on Agricultural developments in Cambodia during the reporting period 2-8 June:

National level: SPK in French at 1147 GMT on 5 June reports that by the end of 1985, there were 2,172,600 oxen and buffalo throughout Cambodia of which 1,105,000 are used as draught power.

Battambang Province: SPK in French at 1142 GMT on 8 June reports that by mid-May, the peasants in Ratanamondol District had tilled more than 900 hectares, broadcast 10 hectares of rice, and planted more than 300 hectares of subsidiary food crops. The district plans to grow 2,600 hectares of rice in this season. According to SPK in English at 1112 GMT on 5 June, by mid-May the peasants in Battambang District covered up 7,000 hectares, including 4,800 hectares by tractor, and sown rice on 2,000 hectares of the planned 80,000 hectares. They also covered 400 hectares with subsidiary pmoh and industrial crops as against the planned acreage of 1,600 hectares. SPK in French at 1133 GMT on 4 June reports that at the beginning of this year, the veterinary service in Battambang Province vaccinated more than 34,850 cattle against epizootic diseases. According to Phnom Penh Domestic Service at 0430 GMT on 3 June, the peasants in Battambang Province sold more than 47,300 metric tons of paddy to the state in May. The radio at 1300 GMT on 3 June reports that by 20 May the peasants in Sangke District had reclaimed more than 90 hectares of land and tilled 500 hectares of land. The radio at 0430 GMT on 6 June reports that by 8 May, the peasants in Battambang Province had tilled more than 20,700 hectares of land, broadcast more than 3,700 hectares of rice, and planted more than 300 hectares of industrial crops and 600 hectares of jute.

Kompong Cham Province: According to SPK in English at 0408 GMT on 6 June, the peasants in the province have thus far plowed more than 13,260 hectares of land. They also put more than 2,290 hectares under floating rice by direct sowing, planted local strains on 568 hectares, and raised seedlings on 660 hectares of land. The provincial agriculture service had also supplied the peasants with 460 metric tons of chemical fertilizer. SPK in English at 1105 GMT on 4 June reports that by mid-May, the peasants in

Cheung Prey District had sold 1,140 metric tons of surplus rice to the state. In the first quarter of this year, the veterinary service in the province vaccinated 20,350 cattle and more than 2,900 pigs against epzootic diseases. The province now has 53,560 cattle. The radio at 0430 GMT on 8 June reports that by early June, the peasants in the province had tilled more than 13,200 hectares of land, sowed and broadcast more than 2,300 hectares of rice, planted 560 hectares of highland rice, and transplanted more than 600 hectares of rice. They also planted more than 7,780 hectares of white and red corn, 370 hectares of potato and cassava, nearly 8,000 hectares of beans, more than 4,200 hectares of sesame, 270 hectares of sugar cane, 19 hectares of castor-oil plant, nearly 40 hectares of jute, and more than 420 hectares of vegetables. The provincial agricultural service supplied the peasants with more than 460 metric tons of chemical fertilizer and prepared 105 waterpumps and a quantity of rice seeds for giving to the peasants in case of need or natural disasters.

Kompong Thom Province: The radio at 1300 GMT on 4 June reports that peasants in Kompong Svay District plan to grow 32,000 hectares of rainy-season rice this year. This includes 4,700 hectares of floating rice. By mid-May, the peasants had tilled more than 3,200 hectares and sowed nearly 3,000 hectares of various types of rice. The radio at 1300 GMT on 6 June reports that the peasants in Baray District plan to grow 33,900 hectares of rainy-season rice, including 7,000 hectares of floating rice and 10,100 hectares of late rice. By mid-May, they had plowed 3,900 hectares of land and sowed more than 2,400 hectares of rice, including nearly 2,000 hectares of floating rice. The radio at 0430 GMT on 7 June says that by the end of the current fishing season, fishermen in this province had caught more than 2,000 metric tons of fish. SPK in English at 1100 GMT on 3 June reports that so far the peasants in Kompong Thom Province have turned up 12,500 hectares of land mostly by tractor. They have also sowed 7,800 hectares of rice, including 7,000 hectares of floating rice. This monsoon, Kompong Thom Province is expected to plant rice on 130,600 hectares of land. SPK in French at 1147 GMT on 5 June says that by the end of May, the peasants in Kompong Thom Province had sold more than 2,700 metric tons of paddy to the state.

Kompong Chhnang Province: SPK in French at 1143 GMT on 5 June reports that by mid-May the peasants in this province had broadcast 2,500 hectares of rice on the 3,600 hectares earmarked for this season.

Kompong Speu Province: According to the radio at 0430 GMT on 3 June, of the 70 hectares planned for dry-season rice, the peasants in Aoral District have so far planted 40 hectares, including 15 hectares of IR-36 rice strain. The radio at 0430 GMT on 4 June reports that so far the peasants in Samraong Tong District have planted 387 hectares of dry season rice. So far, 245 hectares have been harvested with a total yield of 800 metric tons. During the dry season, more than 11,700 metric tons of natural fertilizer were produced and 126 hectares of subsidiary food crops were planted. According to the radio at 1300 GMT on 5 June, the peasants in Bar Set District planned to grow 300 hectares of dry-season rice. They grew 416 hectares of this rice and by mid-May had harvested 345 hectares.

Katie Province: SPK in English at 1102 GMT on 4 June reports that last year, the peasants in this province planted monsoon rice on 16,500 hectares and put 5,200 hectares other under dry season rice. They also covered 3,000 hectares with subsidiary food and industrial crops.

Prey Veng Province: The radio at 0430 GMT on 2 June reports that this rainy season, the peasants in Kamchay Mea District produced 10,500 metric tons of natural fertilizer and planted many hectares of subsidiary food and industrial crops.

Pursat Province: SPK in French at 1133 GMT on 4 June reports that by mid-May, the peasants in Kandieng District had sold more than 1,550 metric tons of paddy to the state. SPK in English at 1105 GMT on 4 June reports that by mid-May, the peasants in Pursat Province had sold 8,700 metric tons of paddy to the state. The radio at 1300 GMT on 4 June says that by by mid-May, the peasants in Kandieng District has given 320 metric tons of paddy as national patriotic contributions to the state in addition to selling it 1,550 metric tons of surplus paddy.

Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province: According to the radio at 1300 GMT on 8 June, by mid-May, the peasants in this province had plowed more than 5,000 hectares of land, sowed 25 hectares of rice, broadcast more than 2,100 hectares of ordinary and floating rice, planted nearly 600 hectares of IR-36 rice and more than 460 hectares of subsidiary food crops.

Takeo Province: The radio at 1300 GMT on 5 June reports that the province plans to buy 8,000 metric tons of rainy-season rice this year. So far, 7,000 metric tons, or 87.5 percent of the plan, have been bought. Only 780 metric tons of dry-season rice bought out of 7,000 metric tons earmarked for dry-season rice purchase. Thus, of the 15,000 metric tons earmarked for both rainy and dry-season rice purchase, 7,780 metric tons have been bought. 5,639 metric tons of rice has also been collected as patriotic contributions out of the 9,005 metric tons earmarked for patriotic contribution collection. The radio at 0430 GMT on 5 June says that by the end of May, the peasants in Takeo Province had tilled more than 22,500 hectares of land, sowed almost 400 hectares of early rice, transplanted almost 400 hectares of rice, and broadcast nearly 2,600 hectares of floating rice. The radio at 0430 GMT on 8 June reports that by 10 May, the tractor operators in Takeo Province tilled more than 17,116 hectares of land out of the 23,000 hectares to be completed by them.

9-15 June Period

BK161319 [Editorial Report] Cambodian media monitored by Bangkok Bureau carried the following reports on agricultural developments in Cambodia during the reporting period 9-15 June:

National level: According to SPK in English at 1109 GMT on 15 June, in the first 5 months of this year the department for buying farm and aquatic products under the Ministry of Home and Foreign Trade had bought nearly

6,000 metric tons of surplus products from the peasants across the country. The figure represents an increase of 1,100 metric tons over the same period last year. Leading was Kompong Cham Province, which sold the state 2,200 metric tons of beans.

Kompong Cham Province: Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian at 0430 GMT on 15 June reports that by mid-April, peasants in Ponhea Krek District had tilled more than 4,000 hectares of land and sowed 190 hectares of early rice. In a report in French transmitted at 1128 GMT on 11 June, SPK says that by the end of May, peasants in O Reang Euv District had sold to the state more than 746 metric tons of paddy.

Battabang Province: At 1300 GMT on 9 June, the radio reports that by the third week of May, peasants in Ratanamondol District had tilled more than 900 hectares of land. In another report broadcast at 1300 GMT on 12 June, the radio says that in early March, the agricultural service in the province distributed 440 metric tons of chemical fertilizers, insecticides, and rice seeds to local peasants. According to a report by SPK in English at 1109 GMT on 9 June, by mid-May, peasants in the province had put 2,700 hectares under long-term rice by direct sowing.

Prey Veng Province: The radio, at 0430 GMT on 9 June, reports that by May, peasants in Sithor Kandal District had harvested more than 1,500 hectares of dry season rice with an average yield of 1.5 metric tons per hectare. In another report broadcast at 1300 GMT on 9 June, the radio says that by 30 March, peasants in the province had planted more than 2,000 hectares of subsidiary crops and almost 1,000 hectares of industrial crops.

Kompong Thom Province: According to the radio at 1300 GMT on 10 June, at the end of May, peasants in Stoung District had tilled 1,900 hectares of land, sowed 980 hectares of rice, and planted nearly 100 hectares of corn. At 0430 GMT on 11 June, the radio reports that by mid-May, peasants in Kompong Svay District had tilled more than 5,100 hectares of land, broadcast 4,400 hectares, and planted 550 hectares of slash-and-burn rice and more than 50 hectares of early rice. At 1300 GMT on 12 June, the radio reports that by 29 April, peasants in Baray District had tilled more than 2,100 hectares of land, broadcast almost 900 hectares of slash-and-burn rice, and sowed almost 50 hectares of early and late rice. More than 250 hectares of subsidiary crops and almost 50 hectares of industrial crops had also been planted, adds the report. According to the radio at 1300 GMT on 13 June, by 15 May, peasants in the province had tilled more than 11,500 hectares of land and broadcast more than 6,100 hectares of rice. At 1300 GMT on 14 June, the radio reports that by the third week of May, peasants in Santuk District had broadcast almost 3,200 hectares of rice and planted almost 900 hectares of subsidiary crops. In a report broadcast at 0430 GMT on 15 June, the radio says that during this dry season, peasants in Baray District had sown rice seeds on 32 hectares of land and transplanted 266 hectares of rice. So far, 968 hectares of land have been tilled, adds the report.

Takeo Province: At 0430 GMT on 11 June, the radio reports that by 18 May, peasants in the provincial seat had sold more than 14,000 metric tons of paddy to the state. In another report carried by the radio in the same cast, by 10 May, 17,116 hectares of land of the planned 23,000 hectares had been tilled by the provincial tractor group. At 0430 GMT on 13 June, the radio reports that by mid-May, peasants in the province tilled more than 17,900 hectares of land, broadcast 1,600 hectares of floating rice, sowed or transplanted 160 hectares of early rice. According to SPK in French at 1137 GMT on 10 June, the provincial trade service bought 8,300 metric tons of paddy from peasants in May. According to SPK in English at 1109 GMT on 15 June, the veterinary service in Tram Kak District, during the first quarter of this year, had vaccinated more than 5,580 head of cattle against epizootic diseases.

Kadal Province: In a report broadcast at 1300 GMT on 11 June, the radio says that by early June, peasants in Pnum Penh District had retilled more than 1,800 hectares of land, sowed nearly 600 hectares of various types of rice, and transplanted 6 hectares of IR-36 rice. In another report broadcast at 0430 GMT on 15 June, the radio says that by the end of May, peasants in Dangkao District had tilled more than 150 hectares of land and sowed 250 hectares of various types of rice. This rainy season rice planting has covered 9,000 hectares, adds the report.

Pursat Province: The radio, at 1300 GMT on 11 June, reports that by mid-May tractor operators in the province had tilled almost 8,000 hectares of land of the planned 10,000 hectares.

Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province: At 0430 GMT on 12 June, the radio reports that fishermen in the province caught more than 7,600 metric tons of fish this season. In another report broadcast at 1300 GMT on 13 June, the radio says that by 19 May, peasants in the province had sold more than 13,600 metric tons of paddy to the state. According to SPK in French at 1137 GMT on 10 June, by mid-May, peasants in Banteay Ampil District had sold more than 465 metric tons of paddy to the state. In another report in French at 0400 GMT on 11 June, SPK says that last season, despite many difficulties, peasants in Kralanh District managed to grow 16,150 hectares of rice and plant 145 hectares of subsidiary crops. In another report at 1103 GMT on 14 June, SPK says that last season, peasants in Kralanh District sold 4,300 metric tons of paddy to the state.

Kampot Province: According to SPK in French at 0448 GMT on 10 June, during this dry season, peasants in Kompong Trach District harvested 131 hectares of rice with an average yield of more than 2 metric tons per hectare. Last rainy season, 18,700 hectares of rice were planted and after the harvest, 1,940 metric tons of surplus rice were sold to the state.

/12624
CSO: 4212/85

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

BRIEFS

COMBAT SUCCESS IN PHNUM SRUOCH DISTRICT--During the first 5 months of 1986, the armed forces in Phnum Sruoch District of Kompong Speu Province killed 31 enemies, wounded 12 others, and took 3 others prisoner, and seized 6 B-40's, 2 AK's, 1 pistol, and some war materiel. [Excerpts] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 7 Jun 86 BK] /12624

RETURNEES IN KRATIE PROVINCE--According to the chairman of the Kratie District People's Revolutionary Committee in an interview with a radio correspondent, between 14 April and 19 May, 49 misled persons returned to the fold in the district. [Summary] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 BMT 5 Jun 86 BK] /12624

SRV INSPECTION COMMISSION DELEGATION--The delegation of Vietnam's State Inspection Commission led by Comrade Bui Quang Tao, member of the CPV Central Committee and chairman of Vietnam's State Inspection Commission, paid a visit to Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province on 13 June. The delegation was received cordially and had intimate conversation with Comrade (Ien To), member of the Province's Provisional Party Committee and vice chairman of the Provincial People's Revolutionary Committee. The delegation visited Angkor Wat Temple where it admired the beautiful art pieces which reflected the splendid civilization and culture of the Cambodian people. [Text] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1300 GMT 14 Jun 86 BK] /12624

MILITARY SUCCESS IN SIEM REAP--At the beginning of 1986, the armed forces of Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province launched 350 operations to sweep up the enemies. During these operations, they clashed with the enemies on six occasions. They also launched three large-scale operations in various important regions. As a result, 137 enemies were killed, 215 wounded, and 4 others were captured. Moreover, 112 enemies, including 92 Pol Pot soldiers, 6 Sereika soldiers, 13 para [KPNLF unit] soldiers, and 1 Moulinake soldier, surrendered to our armed forces. These returnees brought along 135 assorted weapons for our revolutionary authorities. [Text] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1300 GMT 14 Jun 86 BK] /12624

KPRP GROUP ON SRV TOUR--At the invitation of the Organization Commission of the Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee. on the morning of 5 June, a delegation from the KPRP Central Organization Commission comprising 11 members and led by Comrade Men Sam-an, member of the party Central Committee Political Bureau and chairman of the Central Organization Commission, left for the SRV to study and learn organization experiences. Seeing the delegation off at Pochentong Airport were Comrade Ney Pena, member of the party Central Committee Political Bureau and interior minister; Comrade Yos Son, member of the party Central Committee and vice chairman of the Central Commission for External Relations; Comrade Neou Samom, vice chairman of the Central Organization Commission; Comrade Nim Thot, vice chairman of the Central Propaganda and Education Commission; and many cadres from the Central Organization Commission. Comrade Ngo Dien, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the SRV to Cambodia, was also present. [Text] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 5 Jun 86 BK] /12624

RECEIPT OF PHAM VAN DONG THANKS--Comrade Pham Van Dong, chairman of the SRV Council of Ministers, recently sent a message of thanks to Comrade Hun Sen, chairman of the PRK Council of Ministers, for his message of sympathy on losses suffered by the Vietnamese people due to tornado. The message noted: I am very moved by the sympathy you expressed on the losses suffered by the Vietnamese people due to a tornado in various regions. On behalf of the Council of Ministers and the people of Vietnam, I would like to express profound thanks to you and all Cambodian people. [Text] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 7 Jun 86 BK] /12624

CSO: 4212/85

CENTRAL HIGHLAND MILITARY-POLITICAL SCHOOL TRAINS ETHNIC CADRES

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 17 Apr 86 p 1

[Article by Nguyen Phuc Am: "Central Highland Military-political School Holds Classes To Train Cadres from Ethnic Minorities"]

[Text] So far, the Central Highlands Military-political School has held six classes to provide basic and advanced training to ethnic minority cadres serving as platoon and company leaders in the infantry and other services. By the end of last year, the school was assigned the additional task of training ethnic teenagers, grooming them as future military cadres for the Central Highlands and the 5th Military Region.

The first class included 152 youths between the ages of 10 and 14 from 28 different nationalities--Gia Lai, Ba Na, E De, Mo Rong, Kha, Xe Dang, Ktra, Kdong, Ho Ren, etc.--most of whom come from families of the war dead, cadres, and army men in Dac Lac, Lam Dong, and Gia Lai-Kontum Provinces and the eastern parts of Quang Nam-Da Nang, Nghia Binh, Thuan Hai, and Phu Khanh Provinces. They were enrolled in courses corresponding to their cultural levels and were expected to achieve three grades in 2 years (with no summer vacations) and take up military training upon completion of general education. While in general school, they are treated as new combatants by the military region and are given an additional suit per year and 1 dong per day for meals by party committees and people's committees from their own provinces. The school adequately attends to the needs of the vanguard teenager unit and youth union and provides various forms of labor and entertainment. A large and beautiful school will be built by participating provinces for students--classrooms by Nghia Binh and Phy Khanh, a museum by Lam Dong, a clubhouse by Quang Nam-Da Nang, and an auditorium by Dac Lac. Construction work on messhalls and dormitories, begun a few months ago by Gia Lai-Kontum, will be completed soon.

The Central Highlands Military-political School has just conducted a preliminary review of the first academic year of this first ethnic cadre training class with 73 percent of the students attaining moderately good and excellent grades.

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CSO: 4209/536

GUIDELINES FOR CRITICISM, SELF-CRITICISM INDICATED

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 18 Mar 86 p 1

[Article by Chau Ai: "Some Thoughts About Criticism and Self-criticism"]

[Text] The directive of the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee on launching a campaign of criticism and self-criticism to prepare for the party congress at all levels has responded to our people's yearning for an ever more wholesome, stable, and strong party whose members--who are comparable to the cells of a body--should also have the same qualities. Earlier, in his talk about the congress of the Cuban Communist Party, Nguyen Van Linh, member of the Party Central Committee Political Bureau and secretary of the municipal party committee, also mentioned this judicious desire of our people when he said: "The congress at all municipal levels must be conducted with a new impetus and a spirit of frank criticism and self-criticism which must be considered a motive power for progress and development."

Our leaders have thus created some very favorable conditions and a propitious atmosphere to ensure that the congress of party organizations at all levels will obtain a practical result.

Among the many things to be discussed and specific measures to be taken to enable the directive of the party secretariat on criticism and self-criticism to exercise fully its sharp revolutionary effect, we think it necessary to further clarify the following points:

Objects of Criticism and Self-criticism--While it is necessary for all cadres and party members to carry out criticism and self-criticism, attention must be paid to helping the following categories to criticize themselves frankly and sincerely: cadres and party members who hold powerful positions, work in the economic and financial sectors and in those related to the people's daily lives, hold dictatorial instruments, and direct and resolve daily affairs in subwards and villages.

Theme of Criticism and Self-criticism--According to the directives of the party secretariat and municipal party committee, there are many important themes. It is suggested, however, that every cadre and party member--especially those in primary organizations in subwards, villages, and

administrative sectors--consider it most important to examine deeply and carefully their viewpoint about the masses and the vital relationships between the party and the masses. In this respect, many people told us: "The municipal party organization has developed a good tradition by trusting and loving the masses of people, by relying on them, and by showing a deep attachment to them as close relatives and has thus overcome many difficulties and ordeals and won great successes. But it is now necessary to reexamine the situation to see whether, over the past more than 10 years, this precious tradition has been maintained and cultivated, or has been neglected and left to dwindle away and whether the people have never been treated wrongly." How is it that beside many good things and many good cadres and party members, there still are some whose behavior and acts do not conform at all to the virtues expected of communists and revolutionaries? For example, these persons behave like the former mandarins, are overbearing, authoritarian, and standoffish, and ignore and oppress the masses. Some of them are even rudely indifferent to difficulties experienced by the masses and feel no pity and sympathy for the particular fate, situation, sentiments, and misfortune of each human being. To date, a number of cadres in some areas have sometimes acted contrary to party policies, especially those of a humanitarian nature, which has caused the people to misunderstand our party, made them angry with our regime, and limited their active contributions to the common cause. Everyone hopes that during the forthcoming campaign of criticism and self-criticism, shortcomings and errors about the viewpoint toward and relationships with the masses will be carefully analyzed and resolutely corrected in order to turn all cadres and party members into real servants of the people and to induce them to respect, trust, and love the people, to display deep sympathy for all the difficulties and situations of the people, to care wholeheartedly for the people's lives, to rely on the people to carry out tasks, and to win the people's confidence and love--the kind of confidence and love felt for close relatives--instead of being feared by them. In conducting the forthcoming campaign of criticism and self-criticism, it is necessary to see clearly the actual fact that "at present, despite the party's appeal, people are still reluctant to contribute views to criticize cadres and party members--including those cadres and civil servants who are not party members but wield little or great power--for fear of losing 'peace' and incurring their 'displeasure' after expressing critical views. Usually, the criticized person will show aloofness if his reaction is mild, or will cause all kinds of trouble if his reaction is strong." A retired cadre living in a certain subward said: "Because we are also afraid, how can other people be expected to criticize?" At a meeting held in a locality to express critical but constructive views about the public security forces--despite the presence of a leading cadre from the high echelon and despite the absence of the criticized person--many participants dared not express their views for fear that "the news would eventually be conveyed to the person concerned." Therefore, while it is essential to organize seriously the direct collection of the people's constructive views according to the usual methods, it is primarily important that each cadre and party member should criticize himself in a conscientious, sincere, and highly responsible manner. One of the most important topics for

criticism and self-criticism is whether we have set good examples in performing our labor and tasks and in our own lives and whether we have really played the vanguard role characterized by purity and simplicity. In carrying out criticism and self-criticism, one must also be specific, focus on the most important problems, and avoid "evening up good and bad points" and "striking a balance" between right and wrong in a formalistic manner.

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ENROLLMENT OF NEW PARTY MEMBERS IN HA NAM NINH REPORTED

Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH in Vietnamese 4 Feb 86 p 1

[Article: "In 1985, Party Units in Entire Province Enrolled Over 2,000 New Members: 659 Key Cadres Provided Advanced Training"]

[Text] In the past year, party units in the province accepted 2,097 new members, an increase of 14.5 percent over 1984. Of the new members, 59.45 percent were of a young age, 15.7 percent were workers, and women made up 28.5 percent. The seven party chapters of Hai Hau, Nam Ninh, Xuan Thuy, the city of Nam Dinh, and the districts of Tam Diep, Hoa Lu, and Y Yen were credited with enrolling the greatest number of members in the year. Many party chapters in the districts and basic units made party development a permanent responsibility, focusing on observing targets and ensuring quality. Background checks and reviews were conducted in accordance with due process and in a timely and thorough manner. In addition to efforts to enroll new members, party units paid due attention to educating new members, promoting their vanguard role and exemplary conduct, and resolutely eliminating unworthy individuals. Despite all those efforts, in the past year, 46.5 percent of the party units in the province still did not do a good job in party development, and some units were still unable to enroll any new members several years in a row.

In addition to the provision of complementary training to enhance the cadres' educational level in all fields at the basic units, party chapters gave special attention to providing advanced training for incumbent key cadres and those specifically designated in the plan. In 1985, the entire province sent 268 key cadres to intermediate and advanced political theory courses, and 203 comrades received advanced training in economic and administrative management or were sent to universities as full-time or part-time students. Advanced specialized training was given to 118 cooperative directors, 72 other directors, deputy directors, and 98 accountants. Cadre training and advanced training were conducted in close coordination with the improvement of the party mechanism. The focus was a stronger party organization able to discharge efficiently its leadership responsibilities and its political tasks.

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HA NAM NINH SOCIOECONOMIC GOALS FOR 1986

Ham Dinh HA NAM NINH in Vietnamese 4 Feb 86 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Fourth Meeting of the 4th Session of the Provincial People's Council: Socioeconomic Goals for 1986 Set; Comrade Secretary of the CPV Provincial Committee Commented on the Spirit of the Resolution of the 9th Plenum of the CPV Central Committee and Reported Results of the 10th Meeting of the 7th Session of the Congress"]

[Text] The provincial people's council has held the fourth meeting of the sixth session on 27 and 28 February 1986. At the meeting, the people's committee made a report on the execution of political and social tasks in 1985 and presented to the people's body an outline of the direction of its efforts and socioeconomic goals for 1986. The execution of the 1985 budget, the 1986 direction of the efforts and tasks in terms of financial and budgetary matters, judicial activities in 1985, and court work in 1986 were also presented. Comrade Nguyen Van An, secretary of the CPV provincial chapter, and the head of the provincial delegation to congress also made comments on the spirit of the resolution of the 9th Plenum of the CPV Central Committee and on the resolution of the 10th meeting of the 7th session of the congress.

After 2 days of strenuous work, the provincial people's council reached a consensus on the provisions of the resolution of the 9th Plenum of the CPV Central Committee and the resolution of the 10th meeting of the 7th session of the congress pertaining to the situation, the socioeconomic goals, and the state plan for 1986. The people's council also unanimously approved reports made before the body by the provincial people's committee and by various sectors. As regards the 1986 socioeconomic development plan, the provincial people's council approved the following important targets:

-- To strive to attain an output of 900,000 tons of grain.

-- To develop industrial planting strongly, with 10 percent of the area set aside for industrial plants for export; to strive to raise the production of agricultural products for export, including peanuts, tobacco, and jute, and to rush from 20 to 40 percent over 1985.

-- To develop animal husbandry totally, including an output of 30,000 tons of hogs, and the expansion of cattle herds to ensure that the needs in pull

force and in cattle reproduction are met; to step up the breeding and raising of marine products, particularly catching shrimp and sea fish and increasing the output of shrimp for export.

-- To reach a general output of small industries and handicrafts of 210 million dong, up 8 percent over 1985.

-- To use investment capital efficiently for capital construction managed by the central government and to use local sources of investments efficiently, focusing on vital key projects; to pay special attention to the use of capital in the spirit that "the state and the people work together; the province, districts, and basic units mind together."

-- To reinforce the communications and transportation sector with additional physical means and investment sources; to ascertain the building of 1,000 to 2,000 tons of new mixed river-sea ships in order to address the needs of transportation between the north and the south.

-- To strive to reach a total of 65 million dong in exported goods.

-- To guarantee the purchase of 180,000 tons of grain, 13,000 tons of pork, 6,000 tons of yam beans, 1,500 tons of dried tobacco, 55,000 tons of sugarcane, 1,000 tons of unshredded jute, 4,000 tons of shredded jute, and 16,000 tons of split rush.

-- To achieve a local general income of 347 million dong, with emphasis on strict management of the income and expense plan and on balancing the budget.

-- To send 43,000 persons to new economic zones, including 20,000 laborers; to strive to bring down the population growth rate to 1.7 percent.

-- To accommodate 130,000 children in child care homes, 110,000 children in kindergartens, 44,000 students in general secondary schools, 573,000 students in general elementary schools, and 28,000 in supplementary education.

-- To make appropriate investments for S&T development, to boost the application of technical progress, and to promote movements for innovative ideas and technical improvement.

-- To step up health, sports and gymnastics, radio broadcast, cultural, and artistic activities in support of political tasks and in building a new cultural lifestyle and the new socialist man.

-- To strengthen security and national defense work, particularly making each district a military fortress and providing political security and social safety in any circumstances.

In order to carry out the 1986 socioeconomic tasks successfully, the provincial people's council ordered the provincial people's committee and all levels and sectors to develop as soon as possible a homogenous execution plan and,

in the meantime, to monitor closely their subordinate's activities in order to achieve productivity, quality, and efficiency.

The provincial people's council appeals to basic units to pay appropriate attention to unit improvement and reform with the focus on strengthening the unit, concentrating on production and business, and ensuring the people's right to collective ownership.

The provincial people's council appeals to the provincial people's committee to change its management methods, to improve the conduct of economic and social activities, and to respect and promote the right to ownership by the basic units and the working people.

The provincial people's council appeals to all citizens and armed forces personnel in the whole province to sustain the momentum achieved in 1985 and to kick off a socialist emulation movement: emulation of group and individual heroes and of progressive models through practical deeds. In the immediate future, efforts must be mastered to do production work well for the 1986 fifth-month crop and to improve the people's livelihood, particularly in the upcoming preharvest lean period. The police, the organs of control, and the courts must maintain and improve the protection of political security and social order and must impose stiff penalties for any violation of the law.

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MISUSE OF RECOMMENDATION LETTERS DISCLOSED

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 19 Mar 86 p 4

[Article by Phuong Thao in "Market Story" column: "Is There Inflation of Recommendation Letters for Merchandise Purchases?"]

[Text] Most of the time, there are many groups of hoarding traders waiting in front of department stores and shops which sell metal and electrical equipment, machines, textiles, etc. so that the real consumers--especially cadres and workers--can hardly edge their way through this crowd to buy goods at prices lower than in the market. In view of this situation, many commercial units have brought merchandise directly to various state agencies and hospitals to sell it on the spot. These sales have been effected by making entries in the canteen books of these agencies and on presentation of recommendation letters. However, this method has given rise to a negative practice: anyone may have too many recommendation letters issued by various agencies and units for the purchase of only one kind of goods. For example, a corporation in the Third Precinct received at one time 11 recommendation letters from 4 agencies asking to buy bicycles for good reasons but finally only 1 person showed up to "handle" this affair. Another form of "inflationary" recommendation letter was discovered at the municipal department store when a person held at one time seven recommendation letters issued by a construction unit in Phan Tang asking to buy many types of metal and electrical equipment and machines. These recommendation letters were numbered consecutively from 24 to 30 and were duly signed and sealed by the unit chief but the spaces reserved for the name of the addressee and the kind and quantity of goods were left blank, enabling the holder freely to fill out on arrival at the store! There is also the practice of "collecting" recommendation letters to make a profit: in this instance, a person holding recommendation letters belonging to many people came to a commercial unit asking to buy more than 10 types of goods. Many consumers are now very angry at the sight of professional traders standing in front of state stores and holding recommendation letters to buy goods of all kinds. There have been many instances of state merchandise being siphoned off into the market only because of irresponsible issuance of recommendation letters. In view of this situation, it is necessary for the heads of state organs and enterprises and their managerial and administrative offices to reexamine the working method of the agencies in charge of issuing recommendation letters for merchandise purchases so as to prevent their misuse by dishonest people. Beware! Written words are binding upon the author!

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE VIETNAM

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Hanoi TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA in Vietnamese Feb 86 back cover

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LIGHT INDUSTRY VIETNAM

PHU KHANH PRODUCES AGAR FOR EXPORT

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 17 Apr 86 pp 1, 4

[Article by Le Quang Khanh: "Factory To Produce Agar for Export"]

[Text] The Nha Trang Freshwater Plant has completed the construction of the first agar factory in Phu Khanh, with an initial capacity of 5 tons per year. The new product is based on raw materials existing in local coastal areas.

Research Center 3 in Ho Chi Minh City has determined that agar produced by the Nha Trang Freshwater Plant meets essential technical standards for colors, humidity, residue content, and indissolubility in warm water, etc. Agar is a very important raw material being widely used by many countries in the world in their food-processing industry, electronics, and medical research, particularly biotechnology.

The new factory marked a noticeable step in the cooperation between the Marine Products College and the Nha Trang Freshwater Plant to apply scientific research findings to production for high economic-efficiency purposes. In just 1 year, the factory has perfected its production technique while continuing capital construction, training the ranks of cadres and technical workers, and turning out products to acquire revenue promptly, pay back its invested capital to the state, and multiply local exports.

Currently, Phu Khanh Province contemplates associating agar production with on-the-spot labor and population redistribution to help with planning, capital investment, and production and with the effort to expand the [yellow] seaweed [rau cau chi vang] area in Tuy An and Song Cau Districts and to build a stable raw material zone, creating conditions for increased agar production.

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NATIONWIDE LABOR DISTRIBUTION SINCE 1976 REVIEWED

Hanoi TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA in Vietnamese Feb 86 pp 32, 33

[Article by Anh Phu: "Some Facts and Figures About Labor Distribution in Our Country"]

[Text] With a population of 60 million, of whom about 46.7 percent are of working age and 45.5 percent below it, our country has a huge work force which is increasing continuously at a great rate. If people above the working age but who still participate in labor are taken into account, this work force will number 31 million and increase by more than 1 million each year. Because of historic, natural, and socioeconomic conditions, the present distribution of labor in our country according to age group, profession, region, and technical and specialized standards does not promote the effective use of this productive force so that our social labor productivity is still very low. On reckoning, it appears that each person of working age cannot yet ensure a normal subsistence for himself and another 1.13 persons. This situation urgently requires that flexible and uniform measures be taken to manage and plan the population and work force.

In 1979, the work force of our country fell into these age brackets: people aged 16 to 30 represented 52.6 percent, those aged 31 to 50 made up 34.4 percent, and the remainder belonged to the group of persons above 50 or beyond the fixed working age who are still participating in labor. It must be noted that recently, each year about 1.7 million people reached the working age while about 400,000 others surpassed the fixed working age so that the ratio of young laborers has become higher. It can thus be said that our country is in the midst of a "labor boom," which is the inevitable result of the 1955-75 "population boom" (with a birth rate of 4.1 percent versus a death rate of 0.7 percent). This situation is exercising considerable pressure on the task of training people and of solving the employment problem. It is estimated that at present more than 20 percent of the social work force does not yet participate in labor.

Generally speaking, the /technical and specialized standards/ [in italics] of the work force in our country are still very low. Laborers who have college and postgraduate degrees or have attended advanced and middle schools and technical workers make up only about 11 percent of the social

work force (as compared with 35 percent in developed countries and 34.2 in the Soviet Union). This educated force has only begun to concentrate in cities and large industrial zones and most of it (65.4 percent) belongs to sectors which do not produce material wealth.

Among the /national economic sectors/ [in italics], labor distribution is very unfavorable to the building of a modern agroindustrial economic structure.

- The agricultural sector employs the highest percentage of the work force. During the 1976-80 period, this sector employed two-thirds of the national work force; in 1983, it employed as many as 15 million people--this is, over 50 percent of the total social work force in that year. Each year, the work force employed in agriculture has continued to increase by 300,000 to 400,000 people. So far, this work force has been used mostly to grow grain crops; in the near future, it will be actively transferred to animal husbandry and to the cultivation of short- and long-term industrial crops for consumption and export purposes.

- Forestry, a sector with great possibilities of developing production and attracting the social work force, employs only 1.5 percent of this force on 1.5 million hectares of forests and afforestation land belonging to 180 mountain districts.

- Fishing, which is also a sector capable of solving the employment problem for as many as 1.2 million people, has so far employed only about 400,000 laborers.

- The industrial sector employs only a very small percentage of the social work force (640,000 laborers in 1982). Due to objective difficulties, the number of industrial workers has increased by only a few hundred thousand over the past 10 years or so. However, the small-industry and handicraft sector--including a portion of it located within the agricultural sector--has recently attracted a noticeable number of laborers and yielded a large volume of products for consumption and export.

Labor distribution among various regions has also been very disproportionate. In 1976, the work force was distributed as follows among various regions: Bac Bo 43.12 percent (including 15.65 percent in the midlands and mountain region and 27.47 percent in the Red River delta and Thanh Hoa); Northern Trung Bo 9.42 percent and Southern Trung Bo 13.26 percent (including 10.76 percent in the coastal areas of Trung Bo and 2.5 percent in the Central Highlands); and Nam Bo 34.18 percent (including 11.69 percent in Eastern Nam Bo and 21.69 percent in Western Nam Bo). Afterward, during a period of only 5 years (1976-80), as many as 3.3 million laborers were redistributed, including 2.2 million moved between various provinces and 650,000 moved within each province. The number of laborers going to build new economic zones came to 750,000. In 1981, the labor ratios among various regions changed as follows: Bac Bo 42.62 percent (including 15.27 percent in the midlands and mountain region); Northern Trung Bo 9.44 percent; Southern

Trung Bo 18.42 percent (including 2.91 percent in the Central Highlands); and Nam Bo 34.86 percent. In addition to the continuous redistribution of labor (mainly from the Bac Bo delta) to the northern midlands and mountain region and to the Central Highlands, distribution within the territory of each region, province, and even district and village must also receive attention in the near future (from 1976 to 1980, transfers within the area of each region represented as much as 48 percent of the total number of people moved to various parts of the country).

These realities call for the direct and overall redistribution of the social work force. On the basis of an overall program to develop and distribute the production force, it is necessary to formulate quickly a plan to train and use laborers to exploit regional potentials and promote the formation of a rational economic structure for each region and the entire country.

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POPULATION, CUSTOMS, AND CULTURE VIETNAM

FAMILY PLANNING ACHIEVEMENTS IN HA NAM NINH REPORTED

Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH in Vietnamese 28 Jan 86 p 4

[Article by P.V.: "Family Planning: In 1985, Number of Diaphragm-Fitting Cases Doubled That of 1984"]

[Text] In the past year, due to efficient propaganda and educational activities and the smooth implementation of the movement for planned parenthood, there was a total of 88,484 cases of diaphragm fitting in the entire province, a two-fold increase compared with 1984. Of that total, married women between 20 and 35 years of age who volunteered to participate in the program made up 82 percent, and women having one to two children, 81 percent. Localities exceeding targets and experiencing visible progress in the implementation of family planning measures were Nam Ninh, Xuan Thuy, Hai Hau, Duy Tien, Kim Son, and the towns of Ha Nam and Nghia Hung. Some other agencies and enterprises, such as the cotton-processing enterprise, the Nam Dinh silk factory, the Binh Minh farm, the Health Department, and the Construction Department, scored excellent results in educational measures and in having workers and employees campaign to reduce to the minimum the number of births beyond the plan.

What was achieved was due to a thorough understanding by various party and government levels and mass organizations from the provincial to the basic level that planned parenthood is a pressing need and also has a strategic importance in economic development and in the stabilization of the people's livelihood. Many agricultural cooperatives incorporated population reduction targets in their plans and took adequate measures to campaign for family planning and to encourage its implementation by their people. A family-planning leadership committee was created at each district, town, city, village, and subward with the chairman of the unit as the person directly in charge. Many basic units went further by making, in each production group, a survey of women who may become mothers and directed their campaigning and educational activities to those subjects.

In the last year, serving in both staff and technical capacities, health units from provincial to basic levels distinguished themselves in ensuring safety for women who used contraceptive measures. The supplying of tools and medicine for specialized units was done in a timely manner. Many health stations in Nam Dinh, Hai Hau, Duy Tien, Xuan Thuy, etc. trained cadres in dispensing contraceptive measures, and those locally trained cadres were able to meet the ever-increasing needs of women.

At present, localities in the provinces are getting ready to start the 1986 family-planning program with the following three objectives: placement of 100,000 diaphragms, 35,000 cases of fetus vacuuming, and 2,000 cases of sterilization.

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